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ABSTRACT
Adults make many risky decisions daily, such as choosing to drive over the speed
limit or going outside without previously applying sunscreen. How and why adults make
such decisions remains relatively unknown and has gained much research attention.
Traditional models o f decision-making, such as Expected Utility Theory (Bernoulli,
1954) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) have proven too simplistic, as
they do not account for the regular deviations from expected decision-making processes.
Likewise, models that attempt to categorize individuals as risk seeking and risk-averse do
not hold up well when decisional-domain is examined (Blais & Weber, 2006).
Contemporary research has cited many individual factors that influence or interfere with
decision-making processes, such as age, cognitive abilities, and impulsivity, to name a
few. What is missing, however, is a comprehensive model that examines domain specific
risky decision-making processes that are employed across the adult lifespan.
This study examined the moderating effects o f the Domain Specific Risk Taking
Scale (DOSPERT; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) subscales (perceived risk, attitudes
toward risk, and expected benefits o f risky behavior) and impulsivity on the established
relationships among cognitive abilities (general intelligence and numeric ability) and
risky financial and health related decisions. Participants included younger adults, sampled
from undergraduate level courses and older adults (55+ years), sampled from adult fitness
programs. The participants completed a survey packet that included demographic
questions, measures o f cognitive abilities, trait impulsivity, the DOSPERT

(Weber et al., 2002), and several hypothetical financial and health-related risky decisions.
Possible moderator effects were examined using hierarchical linear regression.
Males made more risky health and financial decisions than females. Similarly,
younger adults made more domain-specific risky decisions (health and finance) than
older adults. There were age and gender differences on all aspects o f risk propensity (risk
perception, risk taking, and expected benefits). Measures o f risk propensity (risk
perception, risk taking, and expected benefits o f risk) and trait impulsivity did not
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and domain-specific risky decisions.
Practical and clinical implications are discussed. Additionally, limitations and directions
for future research are reviewed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
For several decades, investigators have examined factors that influence individual
decision-making processes. Traditional models o f decision-making, such as Expected
Utility Theory (Bernoulli, 1954) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
often fail to account for regular deviations from expected decision-making processes.
Additionally, these models are poor predictors o f risky decision-making and do not take
into account personal factors that have been shown to significantly influence risky
decision-making (Rothman & Salovey, 1997; Slovic, 1995). Models which seek to
conceptualize individuals as risk-seeking or risk-averse have also proven too simplistic,
as contemporary research suggests that personal factors and decisional domain are
important determinants o f risky decisions (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Davis, Patte,
Tweed, & Curtis, 2007; Finucane et al., 2002; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979; Weber, Blais, & Betz., 2002).
Much research has shown the influence o f a variety o f personal factors on
decision-making processes. For instance, some research suggests that older and younger
adults differ in their ability to make decisions, with older adults evidencing less decision
making competence. Numerous factors have been proposed to account for these age
related differences, including changes in cognitive abilities (Finucane & Gullion, 2010;
Lipkus et al., 2001), complexity o f the problem for which a decision is required
1

2

(Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, & Schmidt, 2005) and the context o f the decision
(Finucane et al., 2002). Individual differences in numeric ability may also influence one’s
ability to make competent decisions, especially if such decisions are dependent upon
numeric information. If adults are unable to understand the data that is presented among a
set o f risky decisions, this will lead to confusion and difficulty understanding the inherent
risk involved in various courses o f actions. Some research has examined the direct effect
o f numeric ability on health-related risky decisions (Lipkus et al., 2001). Individual
differences in numeric ability also have the potential to interfere with decision-making
processes in other domains, such as finances.
Research has also consistently reported gender differences in risky decision
making, wherein males tend to make riskier decisions than females (Byrnes et al., 1999).
Females, however, may be more likely than males to take risks when there is the potential
o f a positive consequence, such as winning a contest, with little involved cost (Harris,
Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006). Among the leading explanations for these gender differences is
that males and females are differentially affected by their own perceptions o f enjoyment
in the proposed risky behavior, perceptions o f the likelihood o f negative consequences,
and the severity o f such consequences (Harris et al., 2006; Hillier & Morrongiello, 1998;
Weber et al., 2002). Weber et al. (2002) also argue that decisional domain significantly
influences risk propensity, suggesting that risk tolerance is not a stable trait.
Non-clinical impulsiveness, such as that which is part o f regular personality, also
affects an individual’s ability to make effective decisions. For instance, research suggests
that people who are more impulsive, or less disinhibited, are more likely to make poor
judgment decisions on gambling tasks compared to people with greater impulse control
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(Davis et al., 2007). Although gambling experiments approximate real life conditions of
risky decision-making, they often fail to measure how invested one is in making an
accurate decision because the stakes are not real. Some research suggests that issue
involvement, or the degree to which one is invested or involved in a particular decision,
affects decision-making processes. For instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found that
high issue involvement affected the persuasiveness o f messages regarding policy
changes. Thus, it is possible that such approximated real life situations as the gambling
tasks are not particularly salient to the individual, which may account for more impulsive
decision-making. Accordingly, the effects o f impulsivity and issue involvement should be
assessed across a variety of decisional domains, which may be more or less salient to the
participant, thus affecting risk decision-making processes.

Statement of the Problem
People make many risky decisions every day. Moreover, the older adult
population in the U.S. is expected to continue to rise until at least 2050 (Administration
on Aging, n.d.). Thus, many older adults will be in the position o f making important risky
life decisions than ever before. Such decisions will not only affect the decision-maker
him or herself, but also have the potential to impact society. For instance, making poor
financial or health-related risky decisions may affect family members and potentially the
health and financial sectors o f society. Contemporary research has examined factors that
may affect or interfere with older adults’ ability to make competent decisions, such as
general cognitive abilities, but a holistic model o f factors that influence decision-making
across the adult lifespan is lacking.
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A wealth o f research regarding risky decision-making suggests that there are
numerous factors that influence or interfere with one’s ability to make competent risky
decisions, including personal factors that were previously discussed. Much o f this
research has isolated individual factors, such as age or gender, and assessed the influence
on risky decision-making. Consequently, comprehensive models o f risky decision
making that take into account these influential personal factors are needed. Moreover, the
existing literature does not support traditional models o f decision-making that seek to
categorize decision-makers as either risk-seeking or risk-averse; rather, domain-specific
perceptions and attitudes about risk as well as expected benefits o f engaging in risky
behavior appear to be influential factors o f risky decisions (Weber et al., 2002). Based on
the state o f the current literature, as well as the noted shortcomings, a holistic model o f
the adult risky decision-making process is required.
Models of Decision-Making

There are several competing theories about the processes in which individuals
engage while making decisions. Expected Utility Theory posits that individuals make
decisions by comparing risky choices based on expected utility values (Bernoulli, 1954).
From this perspective, rational decision makers should choose the option with the
greatest expected value, where expected value represents the product o f the value o f each
outcome by the probability o f that outcome occurring. Thus, when people make choices
that follow certain logical patterns, such as maximizing value, they are said to be
engaging in the axiomatic approach to decision-making (Stanovich, 2010). This approach
is concerned with maximization o f utility. Therefore, rational decisions should evidence
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consistent and coherent relationships. For instance, one o f these relationships is
transitivity. If you prefer A to B and B to C, then you should prefer A to C. If you do not
have such a preference, then you have violated rationality. The axiomatic approach to
decision-making should also make people immune to irrelevant contextual information
because contextual influence would render decisions unstable, thus reducing their
maximum utility. Although this simple model makes conceptual sense, a plethora of
research has shown that people often make irrational decisions as evidenced by
deviations from this model (Stanovich, 2010).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that Expected Utility Theory does not
adequately capture the decision-making process when risk is involved because decision
makers often violate the proposed axioms. Specifically, people are likely to violate
expected utility decisions in the context o f gains when certainty, probability, and
possibility are considered. For example, Kahneman and Tversky note that when making
risky decisions, people’s decisions will often violate axiomatic decision-making because
they will choose an outcome that does not maximize utility when weighing certainty of
outcomes. For instance, participants were asked to choose between two options in two
choice sets. Option A stated that they had a .80 probability o f obtaining 4,000 and option
B stated a 1.0 probability, or certainty, that they would obtain 3,000. Options C yielded a
.20 probability o f obtaining 4,000 and option D yielded a .25 probability o f obtaining
3,000. In this situation, 80% o f participants chose option B, which implied that
“«ft//(y(3,000) / utility(4,000) > 4/5” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 266). Interestingly
65% o f participants chose option C to option D, which implied a reverse inequality. Thus,
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the participants outweighed estimates that they assumed were certain over those that were
perceived as less certain, or probable. They call this phenomenon the certainty effect. The
tendency to overweigh certain estimates violates the expected utility model (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also argue that Expected Utility Theory does not
accurately capture the decision-making process in the context o f loss. For instance,
participants were asked to choose between two options in two choice sets. In problem 3’,
there was a .80 probability of losing 4,000 and a 1.0 probability, or certainty, o f losing
3,000. In this situation, 92% o f the participants selected the option with the .80
probability o f losing 4,000 over a sure loss o f 3,000, although there was a lower expected
value. In Problem 4 ’, there was a .20 probability o f losing 4,000 or a .25 probability o f
losing 3,000. Under these circumstances, the majority o f participants, 58%, switched their
preference and chose the .25 probability o f losing 3,000. Thus, outcomes that are certain
outweigh outcomes that are uncertain, even if the uncertain outcomes have a greater
probability o f yielding maximum utility. Thus, participants are more likely to evidence
risk seeking behavior for a loss that is probable compared to a smaller loss that is certain.
This phenomenon is referred to as the reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Given the limitations of Expected Utility Theory to account for irrational choices in the
contexts o f gains and losses, Kahneman and Tversky developed Prospect Theory, which
is a model of decision-making under risk.
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) theory posits that there are two phases o f choice,
editing and then evaluation. In the editing phase, the individual will preliminarily

evaluate the various prospects, and this leads to the formation o f simpler representations
o f these prospects. Kahneman and Tversky argue that during the editing phase various
operations are carried out that convert the probabilities associated with each o f the
various prospects, including coding, combining, simplification, and dominance.
Additionally, they note that many deviations o f preference, such as those discussed as
weaknesses o f Expected Utility Theory, occur during the editing phase. Coding, or the
tendency to perceive outcomes as gains or losses relative to a neutral point o f reference,
is a key tenet o f this theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Stanovich, 2010). Kahneman
and Tversky argue that this coding influences people to be risk averse for gains or risk
seeking for losses.
Another key tenet o f this theory is that wealth or welfare are the carriers o f value,
rather than final states as suggested in Expected Utility Theory. Thus, value o f a decision
is compared to a given reference point. For example, $100.00 may be interpreted as petty
cash by one person and a lot o f money by another depending upon their economic assets.
Value is thus a function o f two components: the reference point, or asset position, and the
degree o f change from the reference point. Based on these tenets, Kahneman and Tversky
propose that in terms o f wealth, the value, or utility, function will normally be concave
above the reference point and convex below the reference point, indicating that the
marginal value o f gains and losses usually shrink with their magnitude. Finally, prior to
making a decision, the decision maker must internally multiply the value o f each possible
outcome by a decision weight. Decision weights are subjectively determined from the
choices and are not probabilities, so they do not have to adhere to probability axioms.
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According to Kahneman and Tversky, decision weights assess the influence o f events on
the attractiveness o f prospects, rather than the perceived likelihood o f the events. For
example, imagine that someone could win $1,000.00 based on the toss o f a fair coin. For
most people, the probability o f winning this gamble is .50, but for some people, the
decision weight ti(.50) that is determined from the choices is likely to be less than .50
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Although Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory provides a better
account for decision-making under risky conditions, people still have a tendency to
deviate from the expectations presented within this model. In fact, Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) note that decision-makers often violate rationality when making
decisions and that the frame o f a message is important. Specifically, they argue that
messages can be framed in terms o f relative costs, which are referred to as loss frames, or
gain frames, which emphasize the benefits o f a given behavior. For instance, the Asian
disease problem describes an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people. The
participant is asked to select between two programs to implement, both o f which will
save some lives, but not all. The loss frame presents the program in terms o f how many
lives will be lost, while the gain frame presents the program in terms o f how many lives
will be saved. Tversky and Kahneman found that when presented with a gain frame,
participants consistently prefer the option that yields a certain gain and less risk, such as
200 lives saved, versus the risky prospect o f equal expected value, such as a 1/3 chance
that all 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 chance that no one will survive.
Comparatively, when programs are framed in terms o f losses, participants show a
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reversal and prefer the risky choice frame (e.g. 1/3 chance that no one will die and a 2/3
chance that everyone will die) rather than the certain loss frame (e.g. 400 people will die).
Consequently, those people who choose gain frames are often risk averse, while those
who choose loss frames are often risk seeking. Such framing problems can be based on
acts, contingencies, and outcomes. These findings suggest that the fame, or way in which
the information is presented, affects the way in which the information is understood and
consequently affects decisional outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In a review of
message framing research, Mahoney, Buboltz, and Levin (2011) suggest that framing
effects have been examined in the areas o f consumer behavior, political advocacy, and
health-related behavior. Thus, framing effects are not domain-specific.
Rothman and Salovey (1997) have also analyzed the influence o f message frame
on risky choice decisions. They note that framing effects influence risky choice even
when these messages describe equivalent outcomes, such as those previously described
by Kahneman and Tversky (1981). Rothman and Salovey suggest that there are three
stages in the decision-making process for loss and gain framed messages, which will
determine whether an individual responds to a risky choice in a manner consistent with
the decision-making process proposed by Prospect Theory. First, mental representations
o f the issue are dependent upon the amount o f attention directed towards the message.
Messages can be processed systematically, where one attends to the details o f the
message, or by using heuristics, where one attends to the surface details o f the message.
They argue that systematic processing is likely to lead to the integration o f the relevant
information into one’s mental representation o f the larger issue. Moreover, interest in an
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issue is likely to activate systematic processing and research suggests that personal
involvement moderates the relationship between message framing and health behavior
(Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Rothman & Salovey, 1997).
Next, experience and one’s current life situation are important influential factors
in the receptivity of the message and represent the second stage in the decision-making
process (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Rothman and Salovey (1997) suggest that mood,
disposition, knowledge, and life experience will influence an individual’s willingness to
adopt a given healthy behavior. Specifically, they argue that one’s mood may influence
the accessibility o f mood-congruent information, which may affect whether a message is
processed as mood-congruent. For instance, they note that a sad mood may highlight the
potential o f incurring loss, whereas a happy mood may highlight the potential o f gain.
Additionally, optimists may be more responsive to gain frames, whereas pessimists may
be more responsive to loss frames. Rothman and Salovey also argue that research
suggests that those health related messages that are personally relevant may lead to
counterarguments among recipients. Comparatively, messages about health risks that are
not personally relevant are less likely to elicit such counterarguments and thus have a
lessened effect on risky choice.
Finally, the function o f the behavior presented in the message frame, such as
prevention, detection, or recuperative, is going to influence one’s actual behavior. This
influence represents Rothman and Salovey’s (1997) third stage in the decision-making
process for risky choice decisions. They argue that the decision-makers’ beliefs about the
effectiveness o f the behavior as well as their ability to successfully perform that behavior
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will affect whether or not they actually carry out a recommended behavior. Rothman and
Salovey report that research supports the notion that self-efficacy is a strong determinant
o f behavior.
Collectively, research regarding models o f decision-making suggests that when
making risky decisions, people often violate expected rational decision-making
processes, such as those suggested by Expected Utility Theory. For instance, research on
the influence o f decisional context has shown that decisional consistency varies across
ages. For example, Slovic (1995) found that younger adults exhibit less consistent
decision-making as a function o f constructive processes that are influenced by decisional
context. Likewise, Finucane et al. (2002) report that there is strong evidence supporting
the notion that age-related changes in working-memory affect the judgmental heuristics
that are used and render older adults more susceptible to being influenced by the
decisional context. Based on these findings, it is possible that judgmental heuristics are
differentially used by older and younger adults, highlighting an important deviation from
models o f decision-making. Rothman and Salovey (1997) also suggest that a variety o f
personal factors, including attention, personal involvement, experience, life situation, and
contextual information are highly influential when making risky decisions. Accordingly,
future research should seek to determine models o f risky decision-making that examine
the influence o f a variety o f personal factors such as those discussed by Rothman and
Salovey as well as the context o f the decision. Such a model may yield more predictive
power and stronger explanations o f how individuals make risky decisions.
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Decisional Heuristics
Research has consistently shown that people use heuristics, or mental shortcuts,
when making decisions (Finucane et al., 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It has been
suggested that individuals engage such heuristics because they lack the mental capacity to
process all o f the necessary information in a timely manner. Thus, heuristics are
evolutionarily adaptive strategies that allow people to process some information quickly
and make a decision. However, the increased speed comes at the cost o f reduced accuracy
(Finucane et al., 2002). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that there are three
commonly used heuristics that help people make decisions regarding probabilities and
predicted values: Representativeness, Availability, and Adjustment and Anchoring
heuristics.
The Representativeness heuristic is commonly used to help estimate probabilities
based on how much one item or condition resembles another item or condition. For
instance, “what is the probability that object A belongs to class B? What is the probability
that event A originates from process B? What is the probability that process B will
generate event A?” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) argue that there are several ways that the Representativeness heuristic interferes
with an individual’s ability to use probability information. For instance, their research has
shown that base rates, or prior probabilities, have little effect on estimates o f probability.
Thus, individuals consistently fail to use base rate information when evaluating
representativeness and making estimates o f probability. Similarly, people are often
impervious to sample size when making judgments about the similarity o f a sample

statistic to the larger population. Even when sample size is stressed, people continually
make this error. People also misperceive the occurrence o f chance events. For instance,
Tversky and Kahneman report that people are more likely to consider the results o f a coin
toss to be T-H-T-H-H-T, rather than T-T-T-H-H-H, as the second sequence does not
appear random. In this example, they argue that people expect the properties o f the
process to be represented more fairly. Additionally, chance is often conceived o f as a
self-correcting process, where the occurrence o f one deviation will be corrected by the
occurrence o f the other deviation on the subsequent trial. In this example, there is a 50/50
chance o f having either a heads or tails turn up on any given toss and participants believe
that if it turns up heads on the first toss that the process should re-establish equilibrium by
having a tails on the second toss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
The Availability heuristic may be used to help individuals estimate the frequency,
category, or probability o f an event based on how easily similar instances or occurrences
come to mind. The underlying assumption o f this heuristic is that more frequently
encountered or probable examples o f a class or group will be amassed more quickly and
with less effort than rare examples. The payoff o f using this heuristic, however, is that the
ease with which examples are retrieved may bias one’s estimates o f frequency or
probability leading to overestimates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Additionally, Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) argue that salience may affect retrievability, thus biasing estimates
o f frequency or probability. For instance, they suggest that estimates o f probability are
likely to be influenced by personal experience or encounters with an event opposed to no
such experience or encounter. Likewise, recently encountered events or objects are more

easily retrievable than events or objects encountered in the past. People may also make
errors o f frequency or probability based on the use o f faulty search sets. Finally,
availability o f information regularly leads people to make illusory correlations about
events due to overestimates o f the frequency o f co-occurrence o f two events (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
Finally, many people make errors o f adjustment when using initial starting points,
where the adjustments are often insufficient. This type o f error is known as the
Adjustment and Anchoring heuristic. Anchoring refers to estimates that are made based
upon the initial starting point, as various starting points will lead to different estimates. In
order to make quick decisions, people often only engage a few mathematical
computations when making estimates that usually lead to underestimates (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) had participants estimate
the number o f African countries in the United Nations in the form o f percentages from
zero to 100. Initially, the participant spun a wheel o f fortune and then had to indicate
whether the estimated percentage was higher or lower than the number displayed on the
wheel. Additionally, they had to estimate the quantity by which they would have to
increase or decrease the percentage. They found that those participants who spun a lower
number tended to estimate lower numbers, while those who spun a higher number
estimated higher numbers. They also report that payoffs for correct guesses did not
reduce this anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Taken together, these heuristic models suggest that people do not make decisions
in a consistent fashion. Moreover, there is research to suggest that people are susceptible
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to making bad decisions, even when they try to avoid erroneous decision-making
processes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Stanovich, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Indeed, there are many factors that influence the decision-making process. Finucane et al.
(2002) suggest that there are five basic abilities that are required for good decision
making, including the ability to comprehend and recall pertinent information, organize
the various facets o f a decision and choices, understand the personal significance o f the
information, control or overcome impulsivity, and appropriately combine and consider all
of the information. Some o f these abilities will be explored further.

Risk Taking and Decision-Making
Traditional models o f decision-making have attempted to capture the risky
decisional process, but they have several shortcomings. Specifically, these models have
been relatively simplistic and cannot explain regular deviations from proposed rational
decisional processes (Stanovich, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). Byrnes et al. (1999)
argue that there are three major theoretical categories o f risky decision-making (Lopes,
1987). The first category seeks to examine the differences between those people who take
risks and those who do not. Thus, these theories conceptualize people as risk-seeking or
risk-averse. The second category examines contextual differences that promote risk
taking or risk aversion. Finally, the last category seeks to explain both individual
differences and situational differences in risky decision-making. Accordingly, such
theories seek to explain why certain people take risks in specific situations. Previous
research also suggests that several factors influence risky decision-making. Some
investigators argue that personal factors, such as age, gender, cognitive ability, and

personality traits are influential in risky decision-making (Finucane et al., 2002; Byrnes et
al., 1999; Li, Baldassi, Johnson, & Weber, 2013; Davis et al., 2007), whereas others
argue that decisional domain is influential in making such decisions (Hanoch, Johnson, &
Wilke, 2006; Weber et al., 2002).
Personal Factors Related to Decision-Making
Research suggests that there are relationships among demographic variables specifically age and gender - and decision-making (Bymes et al., 1999; Chamess &
Gneezy, 2012; Finucane et al., 2002; Li, et al., 2013; Slovic, 1995). For instance, younger
and older adults may vary considerably on the ways in which they make decisions as well
as their decisional consistency (Finucane et al., 2002; Slovic, 1995). Specifically,
Finucane et al. (2002) note that age-related cognitive changes in processing speed and
memory may lead older adults to depend on simpler decision-making strategies, which
could lead to a discrepancy in decision-making responses to identical questions framed
differently. In fact, Finucane et al. (2005) found that older adults are more susceptible to
framing effects compared to younger adults. Despite these differences, Finucane et al.
warn investigators against interpreting such results as indicative o f underlying biological
differences and suggest considering other alternatives, such as education or motivation, to
name a few. Accordingly, future research should seek to examine the influence of other,
personal factors such as age-related changes in information processing styles that may
affect decision-making. Research has also consistently found that males are more prone
to risky decisions compared to females (Bymes et al., 1999; Chamess & Gneezy, 2012);
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however, this research has not examined gender differences in risky decisions made
across various decisional domains.
Decision-making competence of younger and older adults. Decision-making
competence generally refers to two things. First, whether an individual is capable of
making important life decisions. Secondly, and more generally, however, the term refers
to whether competence is a function o f age, and more specifically, if older and younger
adults differ in their ability to make good decisions (Finucane et al., 2002). Research on
age-related changes in decision-making abilities are mixed, with some investigators
reporting that older adults make less accurate decisions, while others argue that older
adults make equally or more accurate decisions than younger adults (Li et al., 2013).
These differences in decision-making ability have been interpreted in various ways, but
what is clear, is that further investigation into these differences are required.
Finucane et al. (2002) compared comprehension and consistency abilities o f
younger and older adults. Participants were required to make decisions in the three
decisional domains of health, finance, and nutrition. Participants were provided with
information regarding several Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in tabular
format and asked various literal and inferential questions about the information in order
to assess general comprehension. The answers were presented in multiple-choice format.
The investigators found that the older adults made significantly more errors than the
younger adults, with the largest differences resulting from inferential questions. These
findings suggest that older adults are more sensitive to the format o f information and then
such formats become more complex, comprehension suffers (Finucane et al., 2002).
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Finucane et al. (2002) also assessed judgment consistency with respect to values
assigned to several dimensions o f the health care plans o f the various HMOs. In this task,
participants were presented with two hypothetical HMO plans, each with two pieces o f
information. Participants first evaluated each plan separately and then were presented
side by side. For one problem, the investigators found both older and younger adults
evidenced a preference reversal, where one plan was more attractive than the other when
presented separately but when presented together, the opposite plan was judged as more
attractive. Thus, the context o f information significantly affected the participants’
judgments o f attractiveness. Likewise, both groups o f participants showed a
strengthening o f preference for one set o f HMO plans when presented jointly compared
to individually generated preference ratings. These findings are consistent with Hsee’s
(1996) evaluability hypothesis, where judgment consistency will arguably suffer when
information is presented within a context o f comparison, thus allowing for alterations in
the relative value assigned to options when additional, meaningful information is
presented (Finucane et al., 2002).
Finucane et al. (2002) also asked participants to report their preferences for
delegation and decision-making style. They found that older adults reported a stronger
preference for delegating the responsibility o f choosing their health care plan, whereas
younger adults showed a significantly lower preference for delegation. Likewise, older
adults perceived themselves as less rational-vigilant in their decision-making compared to
younger adults. Older adults also reported significantly less skill in using information
presented in tables and charts than younger adults. In a final analysis, Finucane et al.
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found that age accounted for approximately five percent o f the variance associated with
performance on these tasks. Taken together, these findings suggest that informational
context and decisional complexity significantly affect older adults’ ability to make
competent decisions. Furthermore, older adults may recognize the increased difficulty
associated with making competent decisions, which may lead them to delegate important
decisions to others. A limitation o f this study, however, was that decisional importance
was not assessed. It is possible that decisions that are deemed more important by the
individual will lead to increased effort or desire to make competent decisions for oneself.
Additionally, it is unclear whether older adults are actually less accurate at making such
decisions, or if they are more realistic about their abilities to use various types o f data
when making decisions.
Bruine de Bruin, Parker, and Fischhoff (2007) report that age does not negatively
affect older adults’ ability to make competent decisions across all domains. Specifically,
they found that, compared to younger adults, older adults performed better on tasks
associated with recognizing social norms and resistance to sunk costs. They argue that
this may reflect the fact that older adults have more knowledge and life experiences,
which can assist them in making certain types o f decisions. Furthermore, this lifetime
knowledge may counter the effects o f age-related changes to general cognitive abilities
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Li et al. (2013) suggest that there are multiple pathways to
optimal decisions and these pathways may depend on various forms o f intelligence.
Specifically, they argue that crystallized intelligence taps one’s accumulated knowledge
gained through experience, while fluid intelligence captures one’s ability to generate,
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transform, and manipulate information. Moreover, Li et al. note that crystallized
intelligence appears to increase with age, plateauing around 60 years o f age, while fluid
intelligence diminishes slowly starting in one’s twenties. Accordingly, age-related
changes in intelligence and cognitive abilities may explain age-related differences in
decision-making abilities.
Li et al. (2013) argue that older adult’s stable crystallized intelligence may
provide an alternative route to good decisions, fully or partially making up for lower fluid
intelligence. They have referred to this as the complementary capabilities hypothesis
(CCH). Based on this model, decision quality depends on age as well as the relative
influence o f crystallized and fluid intelligence. Li et al. tested this hypothesis in a sample
o f 173 younger adults, aged 18 to 29 years, and 163 older adults, aged 60 to 82 years.
Using structural equation modeling (SEM), they assessed whether older and younger
adults differed on types o f intelligence and five decision-making traits: temporal
discounting, loss aversion, financial literacy, debt literacy, and anchoring. Temporal
discounting measured the participant’s decision to receive immediate or delayed gifts
taking into consideration an annual discounting factor. For example, would you prefer to
receive a $60 gift certificate today or a $75 gift certificate in three months? Loss aversion
assessed the participant’s sensitivity to fixed and varied losses in a number o f binary
gambles. Financial literacy measured the participant’s knowledge o f essential economic
concepts, while debt literacy assessed understanding o f compound interest and credit card
debt. Finally, anchoring examined numerical estimations based on various levels o f
anchor points (Li et al., 2013).
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Li et al. (2013) found that the older adults performed equal to or better than the
younger adults on these measures o f decision-making and that participant age and type of
intelligence partially explained differences in performance. Specifically, SEM provided
evidence for the CCH effects on temporal discounting, financial literacy, and debt
literacy. For financial literacy, direct effects o f age were found, while for debt literacy
age effects were exaggerated after controlling for types o f intelligence. Li et al. note that
these findings suggest that there is a component o f the decision-making process that was
not captured by this cognitive model, such as domain-specific knowledge. Furthermore,
they argue that future research should seek to examine the influence o f cognitive abilities
and domain-specific knowledge on older and younger adults’ decisions.
Taken together, these findings suggest that there are some age-related differences
in decision-making, where some tasks may be more difficult for older compared to
younger adults. Comparatively, tasks that require the use o f crystallized knowledge may
be easier for older adults, as they generally have more crystallized knowledge than
younger adults do. These findings also suggest that contextual factors play an important
role in decision-making. Research also suggests that older and younger adults may use
different types o f intelligence, and consequently, different pathways to optimal decision
making. What is less clear, however, are how other personal factors, such as personality
characteristics affect decision-making abilities. Furthermore, these studies did not
examine age-related differences in risky decisions, which likely require more thorough,
deliberate decisional processes.
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G ender differences in risky decision-m aking. Research has consistently found
that men possess a greater propensity to take risks compared to women (Bymes et al.,
1999; Wilson & Daly, 1985). Bymes et al. (1999) conducted a meta-analysis on 150
studies that compared risk taking tendencies o f males and females. The studies were
categorized into three groups based on the type o f task employed by the investigators:
hypothetical choice, self-reported behavior, and observed behavior. Hypothetical choice
tasks were those where the participants were asked to pick one o f two imaginary options
or choose a tolerable level o f risk for a given hypothetical situation. Self-reported
behavior tasks were those where the participant reported the frequency o f engaging in
various types o f risky behaviors. Finally, observed behavior tasks had participants engage
in various behaviors that were judged to have some degree o f inherent risk and an
observer-recorded behavior. The studies were further categorized based on task content.
Three categories emerged for hypothetical choices, which included choice dilemma tasks,
framing tasks, and other, which consisted o f all other studies that did not fall into either
o f the previous categories. For the self-reported behavior tasks, five categories emerged
and included drinking and drugs, driving, sexual activities, smoking, and other. Eight
content categories emerged in the observed behavior studies: informed guessing, physical
activity, driving, physical skills, gambling, risky experiments, intellectual risk taking, and
other. Bymes et al. also categorized all tasks based on ambiguity, where tasks were either
ambiguous or unambiguous. Finally, the studies were coded based on age o f the
participants, year o f publication, and type o f publication.
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Bymes et al. (1999) found that across 150 studies that examined gender
differences in various types of risk taking behaviors, males were more likely to take risks
than females. Moreover, they found that gender differences in risky behavior were also
related to the participant’s age and the context o f the risk. Results indicated that some
tasks revealed significant gender differences based on the age o f the participants. For
instance, older participants evidenced greater gender differences in driving behavior than
younger participants. Comparatively, some tasks were associated with smaller gender
differences across all age groups, such as smoking. Interestingly, some behaviors (i.e.
sexual activities) had greater gender differences for younger versus older participants,
representing age-related shifts in perceptions o f inherent risk (Bymes et al., 1999). These
findings provide further evidence in favor o f the argument that individuals may possess
different attitudes towards risky behavior depending upon the context in which the
behavior is situated. Furthermore, these findings suggest that as people age, the relative
importance, or riskiness of various behavioral domains may change. Thus, risk propensity
and tolerance may be more dynamic than previously thought.
A fundamental problem with these studies relates to the methods used to measure
risk taking behavior and decisions. As Bymes et al. (1999) note, there are numerous
definitions o f risk taking and most definitions involve factors such as goals, options,
outcomes, and values. Accordingly, variations in operational definitions o f risk taking
affect the ways in which risky behavior and decisional processes are measured. Broad
definitions o f risk taking conceptualize risk as involving the selection and application o f
alternatives that could lead to negative or undesirable outcomes. Such definitions allow
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for the inclusion o f various kinds o f risky behavior, including those that may seem
innocuous, such as raising one’s hand in class, to those that are considered dangerous,
such as engaging in unprotected sex. Comparatively, narrow definitions generally reduce
the inclusion o f innocuous behaviors (Bymes et al., 1999).
Chamess and Gneezy (2012) note that there is extensive variation among the
measures used to examine risk taking behavior, thus making cross-experimental
comparisons difficult. In order to address this weakness, Chamess and Gneezy compared
the results o f several studies conducted by various investigators that all used the same
measure o f risk taking. Specifically, participants were given an amount o f money, $X,
and asked to report how much money they would like to invest in a risky investment
option, $x, and how much they would like to keep. The amount o f money that is invested
is subject to a dividend, $kx (k> 1 ), with a probability o f p and is lost with probability

1

-

p. Thus, the payoffs o f these investments are $(X - x + Ax) with probability p, and $(X x) with 1 - p (Chamess & Gneezy, 2012). In this investment game, k and p are set, such
that the product o f them is greater than one, which renders the expected value of
investing greater than that o f not investing. Accordingly, the choice o f $x, or the amount
to invest, is the only decision that the participant makes. Risk-seeking participants are
expected to invest more money, while risk averse participants are expected to invest less
(Chamess & Gneezy, 2012).
Chamess and Gneezy (2012) found that across all studies, which were conducted
by different investigators and subject to vast environmental differences, consistent gender
differences on this task were reported. Specifically, men invested more money than
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women, indicating that on this investment task, men were more risk-seeking than women.
Based on these findings, Chamess and Gneezy conclude that women make smaller
investments in risk assets than men, suggesting general gender differences in financial
risk taking decisions and behavior. One important limitation o f this study is that only one
domain o f risk taking and decision-making was considered: financial. It is not clear
whether there are more general gender differences in risky decisions and risk taking
behavior. Accordingly, future research should seek to examine gender differences in
risky decision-making across a variety o f domains.
Given these consistent gender differences in risk taking behavior, investigators
are examining possible factors that may lead males and females to evaluate risk
differently. Hillier and Morrongiello (1998) proposed that school-age males and females
may differ in their appraisals o f risk as well as their beliefs regarding their vulnerability
to personal injury. In this study, school-aged children, ages 6 - 1 0 years, were shown
pairs o f photographs, one depicting an unsafe situation and the other depicting a safe
situation for which they had to make decisions about vulnerability to injury, severity o f
injury, and overall relative and absolute riskiness. There were three situations: stairs,
bicycle, and playground, which varied on level o f risk: no-risk, low-risk, medium-risk,
and high-risk.
Hillier and Morrongiello (1998) found that girls rated the various situations as
riskier than the boys, but found no gender differences for relative risk judgments. They
also found gender differences in the most significant predictor o f absolute risk ratings.
Girls’ rating o f the vulnerability to injury was the most significant predictor o f absolute
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risk ratings, whereas boys’ rating o f severity o f injury was the most significant predictor
o f absolute risk ratings. Therefore, when making judgments o f risk, girls seem to
question, “Will I get hurt”, whereas boys wonder, “How will I get hurt” (Hillier &
Morrongiello, 1998, p. 235). Accordingly, they argue that such differences may translate
into different approaches to risk taking behavior, where girls may be more likely to avoid
taking risks when they perceive themselves as vulnerable to injury, whereas boys may
engage in such risky behavior if they do not perceive possible injuries to be severe.
Likewise, girls may be more likely to learn to avoid certain risk taking behaviors if they
have previously resulted in minor injury, whereas boys may not be deterred from acting if
they have obtained minor injuries in the past.
Interestingly, Hillier and Morrongiello (1998) did not find significant gender
differences in the children’s ability to identify hazards across the various scenarios,
suggesting that boys and girls differentially process injury-related cues, thus leading them
to make different decisions about engaging in risky activities. Also interesting, the
investigators did not find age differences in perceptions o f overall risk, although there
were age differences in perceived vulnerability to risk. They suggest that children
perceive the same degree of injury severity across ages and that despite age-related
reductions in ratings o f perceived vulnerability to injury, overall risk perceptions remain
stable across age. Younger children were slower to rate a situation as risky, which has
much practical significance. Specifically, faster identification o f potential risk allows
greater precautionary measures to be taken, thus slower risk assessments may render
younger children more vulnerable to actual risks. Collectively, these findings suggest that
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males and females may differentially evaluate and weigh various cues o f risk, leading to
gender differences in risky behavior and decision-making. It is possible that these gender
differences in cue perception and evaluation are stable, which could explain the
consistent findings o f gender differences in risky decision-making and behavior across all
ages.
Given the abundance o f literature that supports the notion o f gender differences in
risky decision-making, a new line o f research seeks to investigate gender differences in
risky decision-making across various decisional domains, such as financial, recreational,
and social, to name a few. Weber et al. (2002) argue that gender differences in risk
perception may vary by content domain in which the decision is to be made, suggesting
that gender differences may be the result o f domain-specific differences in perceived risk
attitude. Accordingly, these investigators created the Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude
Scale (DOSPERT), which measures risk perception and behavior across five domains:
social, financial, recreational, health/safety, and ethics. They found that in a sample o f
560 adults (307 women and 253 men), males and females significantly differed in their
risk perception scores across all domains except for social, where women perceived the
risks to be greater, although this difference was not statistically significant. Similarly,
males and females reported differences in risk taking behavior across these domains
except for social, wherein males reported that they were more likely to take risks in all
domains. Interestingly, Weber et al. also found that at the level o f the individual
participant, risk attitude was not consistent across all domains, where no one was
consistently risk-averse across all domains, and only a small number (four participants)

were consistently risk-seeking across all domains. Accordingly, these findings suggest
that males and females differ in their perceptions o f risk as well as their risk taking
behavior; however, these differences do not necessarily suggest that males are riskseeking in all decisional domains and females are risk-averse in all domains. Rather,
these findings suggest that there are stable gender differences but that content domain is
an important determinant in both risk perception and risk taking behavior.
Similarly, Harris et al. (2006) found consistent gender differences in risk
perception across four domains: gambling, health, recreational, and social decisions. For
each type o f scenario, the participants rated their perceptions o f the probability o f
negative consequences, the likelihood o f engaging in the risky behavior, the severity o f
the perceived negative consequences, and perceived enjoyment from engaging in each
behavior. Compared to women, men reported significantly greater likelihoods o f
engaging in a variety o f risky behaviors in the gambling, health, and recreational
domains. Across these three domains, women judged the probability o f negative
consequences as more likely and the severity o f these consequences to be greater in the
gambling and health domains. Males reported greater perceived enjoyment in these risky
behaviors across all domains compared to females. In the social domain however, males
and females did not significantly differ in the reported probability o f engaging in the
risky behaviors, nor were there differences in perceived negative consequences or ratings
o f enjoyment o f such activities. Comparatively, women rated the severity o f possible
consequences as greater for all behaviors in the social domain compared to men.
Mediation analysis found that perceptions o f negative consequences and perceived
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enjoyment of engaging in the risk behavior partially mediated the gender differences in
reported probability o f engaging in the risky behavior. For the gambling and health
domains, severity o f the possible negative consequences was also a significant partial
mediator o f the likelihood o f engaging in these risky behaviors. These findings dovetail
those o f Weber et al. (2002) and suggest that males and females may be differentially
affected by perceptions o f the likelihood o f negative consequences, severity o f these
consequences, and perceived enjoyment o f the behavior while making risky decisions
across a variety of domains.
Harris et al. (2006) also examined positive risky behaviors, which were those with
a small potential for substantial gain with a limited certain cost. An example o f such a
behavior includes calling into a radio contest or purchasing a lottery ticket. For these
types o f risky behaviors, women reported being more likely to engage in risky behaviors
and perceived greater probabilities o f positive outcomes compared to men. Accordingly,
when there is no severe risk o f negative consequences and instead a potential to gain
positive outcomes, women are more likely than men to engage in risky behaviors.
Mediation analysis suggests that women are more likely to judge the possible positive
consequences as more likely to occur and they judge these consequences as more
influential than men. These findings suggest that when making risky decisions, men and
women differentially use probabilities o f negative and positive consequences, where
women appear to be more averse to negative possible consequences.
Accordingly, the research on domain-specific risk taking propensity and behavior
suggest that there are stable gender differences, with males being more likely to engage

in risky behavior with possible negative outcomes. This line o f research also suggests that
males are not necessarily risk-seeking and females risk-averse; rather, risk taking
behavior is largely influenced by the decisional domain. Moreover, men and women
appear to use different domain-specific assessments o f the probability o f positive or
negative consequences and beliefs about the severity o f such consequences when making
risky decisions. The next logical step in this line o f research is to investigate age, or
generational differences in risk-propensity and risk taking behavior. Furthermore, such
research may seek to examine age by gender differences, which will further illuminate
risky decision-making processes.
Impulsivity and Decision-Making
In general, impulsivity refers to the tendency to act without much forethought,
which may lead to reckless or risky behavior (Davis et al., 2007). Eysenck and Eysenck
(1978) proposed that impulsiveness relates to two personality dimensions: extraversion
and psychoticism. Accordingly, they argue that venturesomeness, or a disposition to act,
regardless o f knowledge o f the risk involved in the behavior, is related to extraversion.
Comparatively, impulsiveness, or one’s inclination to engage in a behavior without much
forethought and failure to recognize the inherent risk in such behavior, relates to
psychoticism. From this perspective, it is possible that individual differences in
personality and impulsiveness will relate to differences in behavior, including one’s
tendency to engage in risky behaviors. Furthermore, impulsivity may play a critical role
in decision-making, especially when considering risky decisions.
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Previous research suggests that impulsivity is a multidimensional construct
(White et al., 1994); however, investigators disagree on which factors characterize
impulsivity (Miller, Joseph, & Tudway, 2004). Miller et al. (2004) examined the
component structure o f four widely used self-report measures o f impulsivity, which
included the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995),
the Eysenck Impulsivity Inventory (IVE); also called the Impulsiveness Questionnaire or
I7 (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978), the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (DII; Dickman,
1990), and the Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver
& White, 1994). The investigators were interested in determining whether these scales
measured broad or narrow components o f impulsivity. The proposed factor structure of
the BIS-11 was not supported in this study. Miller et al. note that the subscales o f BIS-11
may not be orthogonal and may represent interrelated sub-factors o f a super factor of
impulsivity. Likewise, the proposed factor structure o f the BAS scale was not supported.
Specifically, the subscales o f the BAS all loaded highly onto one factor, suggesting that
the BAS may be unidimensional (Miller et al., 2004). Taken together, these findings
suggest that the BIS-11 and the BAS may be better understood as unidimensional
measures o f impulsivity. Given the literature supporting multidimensional
conceptualizations o f impulsivity (White et al., 1994), these assessments may not be ideal
for measuring impulsivity.
Miller et al.’s (2004) findings suggest that the DII and I 7 scales have similar twocomponent structures. Additionally, the strong correlations among subscales indicate that
both scales measure the same aspects o f impulsiveness. These findings also support the
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notion that impulsiveness can be conceptualized as a multidimensional construct and thus
should not be examined using unidimensional measures. Miller et al. propose that
impulsivity may be ideally conceptualized as consisting o f three components. Given that
Eysenck and Eysenck (1978) conceptualized impulsivity as an aspect o f personality, it is
likely that impulsivity uniquely affects one’s decision-making process, especially when
making risky decisions, which require more deliberate decisional processes. Likewise,
greater impulsivity may cause clinically significant impairments across a variety o f
domains, including social, occupational, and educational, which also affects one’s
decision-making abilities. For instance, individuals with Kleptomania repeatedly fail to
control the impulse to steal objects even when such objects are not necessary for personal
use or hold no monetary value (APA, 2013). Consequently, failure to control the impulse
to steal overrides one’s decision-making abilities because there is no apparent reason for
stealing. For the purposes o f this study, non-clinical impulsivity that is characteristic o f
normal personality functioning will be examined.
Previous research suggests that impulsivity affects risky decision-making (Crone,
Vendel, & van der Molen, 2003; Davis et al., 2007; Penolazzi, Gremigni, & Russo,
2012). For instance, Crone et al. (2003) examined the effects o f disinhibition and age on
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the reverse IGT in a sample o f
adolescents and adults. The IGT is an experimental gambling card task where participants
are given fake money and must make a series o f card selections from four decks o f cards.
Like real gambling, the goal is to generate as much profit as possible. The decks o f cards
are rigged, such that two of the decks result larger immediate gain, but are
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disadvantageous in the end as there are larger penalties. The other two decks produce a
smaller immediate gain and lead to greater future advantages due to lower penalties. The
participants are allowed to choose cards from any of the decks as they wish, but are not
told how many card selections they will be required to make (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In the reverse IGT, penalties are administered upfront and
reward is gained later. Those decks with higher penalties also yielded higher rewards and
those decks with lower penalties yielded lower rewards. Again, the high paying decks
result in equivalent net gains as did the low paying decks (Crone et al., 2003).
Crone et al. (2003) slightly altered the original IGT insofar as money was
substituted with apples, where the participants were gambling apples. The investigators
found that as the IGT progressed, the low-disinhibited participants made more
advantageous choices, evidencing learning, whereas the disinhibited individuals did not.
On the reverse task, however, the disinhibited individuals appeared to make more
advantageous choices as the task progressed. Crone et al. report that these findings are
consistent with previous literature and may suggest that such individuals make poor
decisions in their real lives. This suggests that disinhibited individuals may use faulty
response sets that are less attuned to processing future consequences which may require a
shift in response set or approach. Their finding that disinhibited people performed better
on the reverse IGT is surprising and suggests that perhaps disinhibited people are
sensitive to rewards opposed to future consequences.
There were also age-related differences on task performance. The youngest
participants ( 1 2 - 1 3 year olds) had the fastest response times compared to the older
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adolescents (15 - 16 years) and young adults (college students). In fact, the young adults
had the slowest response times o f all groups. Additionally, participants who were
disinhibited had faster reaction times compared to the inhibited group. These findings are
consistent with age-related trends that Crone and van der Molen (2007) found in another
sample. Specifically, these findings suggest that younger individuals are less sensitive to
future outcomes than older samples (Crone et al., 2003; Crone & van der Molen, 2007).
Accordingly, these findings suggest there may be age-related changes in disinhibition, or
impulsivity, where older participants evidence less disinhibition than younger
participants. A limitation o f this study, however, was that they did not examine agerelated changes in impulsivity in adult samples. Specifically, they failed to address
whether or not people become more inhibited as they age, or if this trend plateaus at some
point during adulthood.
Davis et al. (2007) also found that participants who were more impulsive
performed more poorly on the IGT. Specifically, they found that those participants who
failed to learn the task well enough to generate a positive amount o f money over the five
blocks, were significantly more impulsive than the learners. They conclude that highly
impulsive people may perform more poorly on decisions that require the decision maker
to learn from previous mistakes and adjust behavior accordingly. With respect to risky
decisions, highly impulsive participants were likely to make fast, poorly judged, and
inconsistent decisions (Davis et al., 2007). Overall, these findings are consistent with
those of Crone et al. (2003) insofar as individuals who are disinhibited or more impulsive
tend to make poorly judged decisions that may be less sensitive to future consequences.
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Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that as highly impulsive individuals age they
may become less disinhibited; however, Davis et al. findings suggest that impulsivity
continues to negatively affect the decision-making abilities o f adults in their 30s and 40s.
An important limitation o f these studies is that longitudinal data regarding individual
changes in impulsivity has not been collected. Thus, it is difficult to make conclusions
about how individual differences in impulsivity affect decision-making across the life
span. Future research should seek to explore this limitation.
Penolazzi et al. (2012) suggest that the decisional context, as well as the available
information regarding the decision, directly influences the type o f decision-making
resources that are activated. These investigators assessed various factors related to
decision-making, including impulsivity, and how these factors affected performance on
the Columbia Card Task (CCT). The CCT is similar to the IGT insofar as the participants
are instructed to try to maximize their game score through deciding upfront the number of
cards they would like to draw from a deck o f 32, which possesses both gain and loss
cards. Three aspects o f the game influence their decision: the amount o f loss cards in the
deck, the amount o f points gained by choosing a gain card, and the amount o f points lost
by choosing a loss card. There are two versions o f the game, the Hot task and Cold task
versions. During the Hot task, the participant makes stepwise card selections by revealing
one card at a time and receiving immediate feedback. The participants are allowed to
decide when they would like to discontinue playing, thus taking the round payoff, or they
continue to play until they reveal a loss card, at which point the game ends. The Cold task
o f the CCT requires the participant to indicate upfront the number o f cards that they
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would like to turn over during a given condition. Only at the end o f each session will the
participant receive feedback regarding their decision.
Penolazzi et al. (2012) found that participants who had higher trait impulsivity as
measured by the I 7 were more likely to select more cards during the Cold task o f the CCT
than participants with low trait impulsivity. They argue that the Cold task o f the CCT has
been shown to stimulate deliberative decision-making strategies, opposed to affective
decision-making strategies. In this study, highly impulsive participants appeared to utilize
affective decision-making strategies on a task that required more careful consideration.
Furthermore, Penolazzi et al. suggest that these findings may indicate that impulsive
people may struggle with real world cognitive based decisions requiring careful
consideration o f various options and outcomes. Although this study examined how
personality characteristics such as impulsivity influence risky decision-making processes
as measured by an experimental gambling task, the investigators did not examine how
impulsivity affects risky decisions across a variety o f decisional domains.
Taken together, these findings suggest that impulsivity, or disinhibition,
negatively affects decision-making processes and can lead to inferior decisions.
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that there are age-related differences in
impulsiveness, which adds another element to this analysis. Much o f the research that has
examined the relationships among impulsivity and decision-making have utilized
gambling type tasks, which arguably represent real life risky decisions. One important
limitation o f such research is that decisional domain has been largely unexplored. Some
investigators suggest that risky decisions may be related to the domain in which the
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decision must be made, where some domains may yield higher risk tolerance than others
(Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). Given that previous research has shown that
risk propensity is a function o f decisional domain (Weber et al., 2002), future research
should examine how impulsivity affects risky decisions made across a variety o f
decisional domains.
Issue Involvement and Decision-Making
Previous research has found that issue involvement is an influential factor in
decision- making (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Maheswaran &
Meyers-Levy, 1990; Pham, 1998). Issue involvement refers to the degree to which one is
invested or involved in a particular issue or decision. Petty and Cacioppo (1979)
suggested that the degree to which one is invested in an issue will increase or decrease
the effects o f persuasion, as the individual will be more motivated to attend to and
process relevant information, thus affecting decision-making. They also note that there
are two types o f issue involvement. One type o f issue involvement pertains to whether
the attitudinal issue is o f personal importance. This has also been referred to as egoinvolvement, personal involvement, and personal relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979;
Pham, 1998). Comparatively, the second type o f issue involvement, referred to as
response involvement, pertains to whether the response is o f importance. This has also
been referred to as task involvement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1979) research has focused on the first type o f issue
involvement. They note that highly involved individuals report a sense o f intrinsic
importance in the issue and perceive the issue as having a significant impact on their
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lives. They report that most o f the early work concerning issue involvement sought
groups o f participants that naturally differed on the extent to which they were involved
with a particular issue, while later work sought to manipulate the level o f involvement.
Such manipulations translated into presenting participants with issues with which they
were highly involved, such as the possibility o f increasing tuition for college students,
and issues with which they had low levels o f involvement, such as expanding public park
acreage in a nearby park. Additionally, manipulation studies used message framing
designs that made participants believe that proposed changes would or would not directly
affect them (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
Petty and Cacioppo (1979) conducted a manipulation study to examine the
cognitive response framework o f the effects o f issue involvement. In this study, they had
24 male college students listen to arguments about changes in university policies
regarding mixed-sex visitation and these arguments were either o f high or low
importance. This study involved a 2x2 design, where importance and attitude were
manipulated. High importance arguments were those where the policy changes were
proposed to be instated at the students’ current school, while low importance arguments
suggested that the policy changes would be instated at a school in the area. The
Participants either heard a message that was for (proattitudinal) or against
(counterattitudinal) such policy changes. Petty and Cacioppo predicted that high
involvement would enhance message processing. In order to measure the participants’
attitudes, Petty and Cacioppo had participants read the following statement and rate their
position on four scales: “Because your own opinion about the position advocated on the
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tape may influence the way you rate the quality o f the tape, we would like to obtain a
measure o f how you feel about the views proposed by the speaker on each scale below”
(1979, p. 1918).
Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found that those participants in the high involvement
condition indeed found the arguments more involving than those participants in the low
involvement condition. They also found that issue involvement significantly reduced the
effectiveness o f the counterattitudinal message and heightened the effectiveness o f the
proattitudinal message. Furthermore, they found that high issue involvement amplified
persuasion for strong messages and reduced the persuasion o f weak messages. These
findings suggest that issue involvement affects the perceived importance o f a message,
thus influencing the persuasion o f an argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) reported similar findings and suggested
that when issue involvement was low, participants based their attitudes and responses on
simple inferences. When issue involvement was high, however, participants appeared to
process the message in detail and integrate it with issue-relevant information, yielding
greater persuasiveness. They also found an interaction between issue involvement and
message framing, where under low involvement conditions, participants were more likely
to be persuaded by positive frames compared to negative frames. Under high
involvement conditions, however, they found that participants assigned disproportionate
weight to negatively framed messages, thus making them more persuasive than positively
framed messages. Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy argue that these findings suggest that
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decision-making processes are complex and appear to be dependent upon the integration
o f relevant information, such as message frame and issue involvement.
One limitation of these studies is that they have only examined issues
involvement within the context o f message framing studies. Consequently, research has
not investigated how issue involvement, decisional domain, and other personal factors,
such as age, influence risky decisions made in various domains. It may be that people are
more or less prone to making risky decisions when those decisional domains are of
significant importance.
Cognition, Numeric Ability, and Decision-Making
Research suggests that there are age-related changes in cognitive abilities, such as
executive functioning (EF), intelligence (crystalized and fluid), working memory, and
numeric ability (Del Missier, Mantyla, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012). Moreover, such
changes may affect the ways in which people make decisions and overall decision
making competence. For instance, Finucane and Gullion (2010) found that crystalized
intelligence scores remained relatively high across groups o f older adults aged 25 to 97
years. Comparatively, fluid intelligence scores were negatively related to age, with the
oldest group o f participants (ages 75 to 97 years) having the lowest scores. Lower fluid
intelligence has been associated with greater susceptibility to framing effects (Finucane et
al., 2005) and poor application o f decisional rules (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
Finucane et al. (2005) also report that cognitive skills, including fluid and crystalized
intelligence, accounted for approximately 46% o f the variance associated with
performance on comprehension problems in this sample o f adults. Accordingly, cognitive
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abilities play an important role in decision-making processes and persons o f various ages
may make risky decisions differentially based on their cognitive abilities.
Li et al. (2013) hypothesized that the type o f intelligence required to make various
types o f decisions may lead to different decisional outcomes among older and younger
adults. Specifically, they suggest that older adults may perform better on decisions that
require strong crystallized intelligence compared to younger adults. Likewise, they
hypothesize that decisional performance that is based on fluid intelligence may suffer in
older compared to younger samples due to age-related decreases in fluid intelligence.
They also proposed a complimentary effects hypothesis, which stated that older adults’
intact crystalized intelligence will provide an alternative pathway leading to good
decisions and may at least partially buffer the negative effects o f lowered fluid
intelligence. They found that in a sample o f younger (age range: 1 8 - 2 9 years, M 24.76, SD = 2.91) and older adults (age range: 60 - 82 years, M = 66.39, SD = 4.93), the
younger adults outperformed their counterparts on measures o f fluid intelligence, while
the older adults outperformed the younger participants on measures o f crystallized
intelligence (Li et al., 2013).
Li et al. (2013) also assessed the influence o f intelligence, temporal discounting,
loss aversion, financial literacy, and anchoring, which are traits that affect decision
making processes, on various economic decisions. Temporal discounting refers to the
extent to which one discounts future gains or losses and research suggests that it has a
significant influence on financial decisions, such as whether to borrow money with a
credit card. Loss aversion refers to the extent to which the value o f potential loss
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outweighs the value o f potential gains and has been shown to affect financial decisions
regarding stocks and investments, to name a few. Financial literacy refers to the extent to
which one comprehends financial information and decisions as well as the ability to make
competent decisions related to debt contracts and interest rates. Financial literacy has a
significant influence on consumer’s borrowing and saving behavior. Finally, vulnerability
to anchoring refers to the degree to which one number may influence later number
judgments. Susceptibility to anchoring has been shown to influence consumer judgments
o f buying and selling prices, perceptions o f product values, and credit card repayment
decisions.
Li et al. (2013) found that older and younger adults did not significantly differ on
measures o f economic decision-making. Furthermore, they report that type o f intelligence
partially explained age-related differences on the four types o f decision-making traits.
Specifically, they report that the older adults’ higher levels o f crystalized intelligence
offset their lower levels o f fluid intelligence on decisions that were affected by temporal
discounting, financial literacy, and debt literacy. Despite this finding, age had a direct
effect on economic decisions affected by financial literacy and the effects o f age were
intensified after controlling for type o f intelligence on debt literacy decisions. Li et al.
suggest that these two areas may be affected by domain-specific knowledge, which was
not measured in this study. Accordingly, future research should seek to obtain a baseline
measure o f domain-specific knowledge when assessing the effects o f cognitive abilities
on decision-making processes.
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Del Missier et al. (2012) examined the effects o f specific types o f cognitive
abilities, namely fluid intelligence and numeric ability, and executive functioning on
decision-making competence o f adults. Specifically, they were interested in determining
whether type o f cognitive ability mediated the relationship between executive functioning
and cognitively demanding decision-making tasks as measured by the Iowa Gambling
Task. Del Missier et al. found that type o f cognitive ability and executive functioning are
related to performance on demanding decision-making tasks. Specifically, they found that
fluid intelligence was positively correlated with decision-making performance, with the
strongest correlations with the most demanding decisional tasks. Accordingly, fluid
intelligence is one type o f cognitive ability that appears to influence individual
performance on decision-making tasks. An important limitation o f this study is that only
one type o f decisional task was utilized. Thus, it is difficult to extend these findings to
other, non-financial risky decisions that people make on a regular basis. Consequently,
Del Missier et al. suggest that future research should seek to examine the influences o f
cognitive ability and executive functioning, as well as task specificity on decision-making
processes.
Based on these previous findings, it appears that different types o f cognitive
abilities, such as type o f intelligence, may differentially affect performance on risky
decision-making tasks. Furthermore, it appears that age-related changes in cognitive
abilities may add another layer o f complexity to this relationship. Specifically, it has been
suggested that as people age, they may rely more heavily on task nonspecific resources,
such as crystalized intelligence when working a problem that taps into fluid intelligence.
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It has been suggested that this reliance, or compliment, may buffer the effects o f agerelated changes in cognitive abilities on task performance. Another type o f cognitive
ability, numeracy, is also important when making decisions, especially those that are
based on numeric information.
One o f the most critical aspects o f understanding risk communication relates to
the respondent’s ability to understand numerical expressions o f risk, such a probabilities,
percentages, proportions, and frequencies. Peters (2008) suggests that when respondents
do not understand the data pertaining to the risk, it leads to confusion and difficulty in
understanding the consequences o f the risk not only for themselves, but for others as
well. Such confusion reduces the respondent’s ability to make an effective decision.
Finucane and Gullion (2010) found that numeric ability accounted for 3.9% o f the
variance associated with performance on comprehension problems for a sample o f adults.
Research also suggests that innumeracy may actually interfere with an individual’s ability
to make risky decisions, especially those related to personal health risks (Lipkus et al.,
2001; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997).
Schwartz et al. (1997) examined the relationship between numeric ability and
women’s ability to discern the benefit o f mammography after receiving quantitative
information regarding health benefits o f this screening. The sample included women aged
27 to

8 8

years and 96% o f this sample had completed high school. Numeric ability was

assessed with three questions that examined familiarity with probabilities, percentages,
and proportions. Each participant also received one o f four types o f risk reduction data
that only differed in how the messages were framed. These messages were either framed
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in a percentage o f risk reduction, percentage along with baseline data regarding the risk
o f dying from breast cancer within the next

10

years, probability o f risk reduction, or the

probability o f risk reduction along with baseline information regarding the risk o f breast
cancer death in the next 10 years. The investigators also examined the women’s
perceived risk for death from breast cancer using two scenarios, one o f which asked them
to report on the number o f women per

1 0 0 0

whom they believed would not get screened

yearly and the other asked them to report the number o f women per

1 0 0 0

they believed

would get screened yearly. Risk accuracy was assessed by comparing the women’s
responses about death rates per

1 0 0 0

for not getting screened and their responses about

death rates per 1000 with screening. The accuracy was determined based on how well the
women were able to apply the risk reduction data to their perceived risk o f death, thus the
change in perceived risk with and without screening was o f importance (Schwartz et al.,
1997).
Schwartz et al. (1997) found that almost half o f the sample did not answer a
simple probability question regarding a coin flip correctly. The women in this study also
evidenced difficulty with converting percentages to probabilities, with difficulty of
conversion leading to more errors. Surprisingly, 30% o f this sample did not answer any
o f the three numeric questions correctly. Furthermore, the investigators found that after
reading about risk reduction data, most women erroneously applied this information to
estimates o f perceived risk o f death o f breast cancer both with and without
mammography. It appeared that all four types o f risk reduction data were similarly poorly
applied to estimates o f risk. The investigators found that higher numeric ability was

associated with more accurate applications o f relative risk information (Schwartz et al.,
1997). Taken together, these findings suggest that there is a strong association between
numeric ability and risky decision-making. Perhaps most alarming is that almost all of
this sample had a high school education, yet was unable to solve simple numeric
problems. It is clear that innumeracy negatively affected the women’s ability to make
accurate decisions regarding relative risk. These findings raise important implications for
advertisers and medical professionals who regularly use quantitative data in their
communication o f risk.
Lipkus et al. (2001) examined global numeric ability in a sample o f 463 welleducated adults aged 40 years and older who had post-secondary education. They used
two scales to assess numeric ability: a general scale, which consisted o f three questions
that tapped into probability, percentage, and proportion ability, and an extended
numeracy scale that assessed these same areas, but within a health risk context. They
found that approximately 40% o f their sample was not able to correctly respond to the
general numeracy items, such as converting a percentage to a proportion. Likewise, they
found that converting probabilities to proportions was the most difficult task, as indicated
by poorest performance in this sample. Overall, they found that approximately 15% to
21 % o f the sample was able to correctly respond to all general numeracy items, whereas
29% to 34% correctly responded to all o f the expanded numeracy items. Taken together
these results suggest that even well-educated adults have difficulty accurately using and
interpreting risk communications that involve basic mathematics. Furthermore, the
authors suggest that accurate performance to numeracy items posed within the context o f
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health risks does not mean that the respondent will understand the consequences o f the
risk or apply this information to themselves. Thus, these findings suggest that numeric
ability may influence risky decision-making; however, other factors may intervene and
prevent the respondent from personalizing the presented risk.
Schwartz et al. (1997) note that the majority o f research pertaining to numeric
ability and risky decision-making has been situated within message framing paradigms,
where identical information is presented in different ways in order to determine the
influence o f the message context, or frame on decision-making. Peters et al. (2006) report
that less numerate individuals show greater susceptibility to framing effects. They also
argue that those with greater numeric ability may be better able to access the required
numeric principles that allow them to transform the information within the frame more
accurately. Much less research has examined the role o f decisional domain on
perceptions o f risk and risk behavior (Weber et al., 2002).
Decisional Domain, Risk Taking, and Decision-Making
Recently, a number o f investigators have begun to challenge the widely held
belief that people can be classified as generally risk taking or risk aversive. This
dichotomy suggests that one’s risk propensity is a stable trait (Blais & Weber, 2006;
Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). Weber et al. (2002) argue that people generally
differ in their attitudes towards risk and previous measures o f risk taking attitudes have
failed to adequately measure this concept. Specifically, they argue that previous measures
situated within the expected utility (EU) framework lack cross-domain consistency and
predictive validity. Accordingly, these investigators created the Domain-Specific Risk-
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Taking Scale (DOSPERT), which seeks to examine one’s perception o f risk, attitude
towards perceived risks, and expected benefits from engaging in the risky behavior.
Hanoch et al. (2006) examined the external validity o f the DOSPERT using
homogeneous samples o f risk taking individuals. In order to achieve this, they selected
samples o f people who are risk seekers in each domain, including but not limited to
skydivers, smokers, and gamblers, as well as individuals who are risk averse in the health
domain, using gym attendance as a proxy measure o f health consciousness. They
hypothesized that within each domain, the target subsample would show greater risk
tolerance compared to the other subsamples. Furthermore, they hypothesized that the
subsamples would not show the same risk propensity across all domains, suggesting that
risk tolerance is domain specific. Finally, they hypothesized that the subsample o f risk
adverse individuals (gym attendees) would show less risk behavior in the health domain.
Hanoch et al. found that there was a significant domain by subsample interaction, where
the subsamples of risk-takers evidenced greater risk propensity in the target domain
compared to the other subsamples. Likewise, the risk adverse subsample o f gym
attendees had significantly lower risk tolerance compared to the risk-seeking smokers
within the health domain. Accordingly, these results support the validity o f the
DOSPERT in identifying individual differences in domain-specific risk tolerance.
Hanoch et al. also found that the subsamples reported significantly different levels o f
expected benefit for engaging in the risky behavior across the domains, suggesting that
those who are risk seeking in a given domain perceive greater benefits compared to those
who are less risk seeking or risk adverse. Interestingly, Hanoch et al. found that the
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subsample o f gamblers had significantly lower risk perceptions than the other
subsamples. Taken together, Hanoch et al. reported that these findings suggest that the
expected benefits o f engaging in domain-specific risky behavior may be more influential
in determining risk propensity than perceived risk. Likewise, these results show that
individual differences in expected benefits and risk propensity relate to differences in
risky behavior across a variety o f domains (Hanoch et al., 2006).
Hanoch et al. (2006) report that there are mixed results in the literature pertaining
to predictors o f risky behavior. Specifically, they found that domain-specific expected
benefits o f risky behavior were more predictive o f risk propensity than perceived risk;
whereas Weber et al. (2002) and Blais and Weber (2006) found that perceived risk was
more predictive. In fact, Blais and Weber found that controlling for risk perception
reduced the within-individual, or domain-level, variance in risk taking by 59%. One
reason for these inconsistent findings may be due to the study participants. Hanoch et al.
selected participants who were risk seeking or risk adverse across domains in an effort to
test the external validity o f the DOSPERT. Comparatively, Weber et al. used a
heterogeneous group o f college students. Based on these findings, future research should
seek to examine the predictive nature o f the DOSPERT using both heterogeneous and
homogeneous samples. Additionally, investigators should examine whether predictors o f
risk differ for individuals who have high versus low risk tolerance across the decisional
domains.
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Significance of the Present Study
As previously noted, traditional models o f risky decision-making do not
accurately capture the complexity o f decision-making processes. Likewise, much o f the
contemporary literature has examined single factors that interfere with decision-making
processes, but fail to provide a holistic model o f universal personal factors that influence
risky decision-making. Research also suggests that people may vary in their tendency to
make risky decisions depending on the domain in which the decision is required. To date,
only a few studies have examined the effect o f decisional domain on the decision-making
process. Likewise, little is known about the stability o f decision-making processes across
the adult lifespan. Accordingly, this study tested comprehensive models o f risky financial
and health-related decision-making that examined the influence o f personal factors
including age, gender, cognitive abilities (including crystalized and fluid intelligence),
numeric ability, trait impulsivity, and domain-specific risk perception, attitude, and
expected benefits o f risky decisions.
The Present Study
The present study utilized hierarchical linear regression analysis to test the
moderating effects o f the DOSPERT subscales (expected benefit o f engaging in risky
behavior, perceived risk, and attitudes towards risk) and impulsivity on the relationships
between cognitive abilities (intelligence and numeric ability), and health and financial
risky decisions. Young adults enrolled in college psychology courses as well as older
adults enrolled in fitness programs were included in this study.
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Hypothesis 1
It was predicted that males and females would differ in the number o f risky
domain-specific decisions that they make.
Hypothesis la . Males will make more risky financial decisions than females.
Hypothesis lb . Males will make more risky health decisions than females.
Justification for Hypotheses la and lb
Previous research indicates that males make riskier decisions and engage in more
risky behavior than females (Byrnes et al., 1999; Chamess & Gneezy, 2012; Harris et al.,
2006; Hillier & Morrongiello, 1998; Weber et al., 2002). This gender trend has also been
replicated in domain-specific risk taking behavior (Harris et al., 2006; Weber et al.,
2002). It was predicted that gender differences in risky decision-making in financial and
health domains will be replicated in this study. It was also proposed that significant
gender differences in risky decision-making would be controlled in subsequent analyses.
Hypothesis 2
It was predicted that older and younger adults would differ in the number o f risky
domain-specific decisions that they made. Specifically, younger adults would make more
domain-specific risky decisions than older adults.
Justification for Hypothesis 2
Previous research regarding decision-making competence among older and
younger adults yields mixed findings (Li et al., 2013). Additionally, research suggests
that a variety o f factors, such as the context o f information under consideration and
intelligence may affect older and younger adults’ ability to make competent decision

(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Li et al., 2013). Collectively, research suggests that there
may be some age-related differences in decision-making abilities o f older and younger
adults; however, additional research is required to assess age-related differences in
domain-specific risky decision-making. It was proposed that if older and younger adults
differed in the amount o f domain-specific risky decisions that they made then age would
be entered as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
Hypothesis 3
It was predicted that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Perception o f risk,
Attitudes towards risk, and Expected benefits o f risky behavior) would moderate the
relationships between cognitive abilities (total cognitive abilities and numeric ability) and
risky financial decisions (see Figure 1).

53

DOSPERT:
Risk Perception
Risk Attitude
Expected Benefits

Cognitive Abilities:
Intelligence
Numeric Ability

Risky Financial
Decisions

Covariates:
Age
Gender

Figure 1. Hypothesized moderating effects o f the DOSPERT subscales on the
relationship between cognitive abilities and financial risky decisions.
H ypothesis 3a. Hypothesis 3a stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
by risk perception, such that risk perception will increase the impact o f cognitive abilities
on risky financial decision-making.

Hypothesis 3b. Hypothesis 3b stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
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by risk taking, such that risk taking will decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky
financial decision-making.

Hypothesis 3c. Hypothesis 3c stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
by expected benefits, such that expected benefits will decrease the impact o f cognitive
abilities on risky financial decision-making.

Justification for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c
Previous research indicates that there is a direct relationship between cognitive
abilities and risky financial decision-making and it is has been suggested that this
relationship is affected by domain-specific knowledge (Li et al., 2013). Similarly,
perception o f risk, attitudes towards risk, and expected benefits o f engaging in risky
behavior are significant predictors o f risky financial decision-making (Blais & Weber,
2006; Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). In the present study, domain-specific risk
perception, risk taking, and expected benefits o f risky behavior were proposed to
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and risky financial decision-making
as these variables may influence the relative salience o f risk communication, thus altering
the existing relationship between cognitive abilities and risky financial decision-making.
It was hypothesized that risk perception would increase the impact o f cognitive
abilities on risky financial decision-making as risk perception has been shown to
differentially affect estimates o f relative gains and losses and lead to more or less risk
taking behavior (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Similarly, risk taking was hypothesized to

moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and risky financial decisions such
that it would decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky financial decision
making, as previous research has found that risk propensity significantly affects the
salience o f relative threat or opportunity in risk communication (Sitkin & Weingart,
1995). Finally, expected benefits o f risky financial decision-making was hypothesized to
decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky financial decision-making. Hanoch et
al. (2006) found that subsamples o f risk seeking individuals significantly differed in their
ratings o f expected benefits o f domain-specific risky behavior, increasing their likelihood
of engaging in domain-specific risky behavior. Accordingly, they argued that expected
benefits o f risky behavior significantly affected the decision-making process whereby
subsamples of risk seekers were more likely to engage in risky domain-specific behavior.
Hypothesis 4
It was predicted that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Perception o f risk,
Attitudes towards risk, and Expected benefits o f risky behavior) would moderate the
relationships between cognitive abilities and risky health decisions (see Figure 2).
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DOSPERT:
Risk Perception
Risk Attitude
Expected Benefits

Cognitive Abilities:
Intelligence
Numeric Ability

Risky Health
Decisions

Covariates:
Age
Gender

Figure 2. Hypothesized moderating effects o f the DOSPERT subscales on the
relationship between cognitive abilities and health risky decisions.
Hypothesis 4a. Hypothesis 4a stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
by risk perception, such that risk perception will increase the impact o f cognitive abilities
on risky health decision-making.
Hypothesis 4b. Hypothesis 4b stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
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by risk taking, such that risk taking will decrease the impact o f cognitive abilities on risky
health decision-making.
Hypothesis 4c. Hypothesis 4c stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky decision-making, but this relationship will be moderated
by expected benefits, such that expected benefits will decrease the impact o f cognitive
abilities on risky health decision-making.
Justification for Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c
Published research demonstrates a relationship between cognitive abilities and
risky health decision-making (Schwartz et al., 1997). Moreover, the risky decision
making process is affected by domain-specific knowledge and risk propensity, including
risk perception, risk taking, and expected benefits (Blais & Weber, 2006; Hanoch et al.,
2006; Weber et al., 2002). Measures o f risk propensity (risk perception, risk taking, and
expected benefits) are hypothesized to moderate the relationship between cognitive
abilities and risky health decisions as these factors may alter the salience o f risk
communication. For instance, risk perception may influence approximations o f relative
gains and losses presented in risk communication. Similarly, risk taking, or one’s general
inclination toward risky behavior may differentially underscore the relative threat or
opportunity in risk communication, thus affecting risky decision-making (Sitkin &
Weingart, 1005). Expected benefits o f risky behavior have been found to predict actual
risky decision-making and again may influence the ways in which risk communication is
processed when making risky decisions (Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002).
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Hypothesis 5
It was predicted that impulsivity would moderate the relationship between
cognitive abilities and domain-specific risky decisions.
Hypothesis 5a. Hypothesis 5a stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky financial decision-making, but this relationship will be
moderated by impulsivity, such that impulsivity will decrease the impact o f cognitive
abilities on risky financial decision-making (see Figure 3).

Impulsivity

Cognitive Abilities:
Intelligence
Numeric Ability

Risky Financial
Decisions

Covariates:
Age
Gender

Figure 3. Hypothesized moderating effects o f impulsivity on the relationship between
cognitive abilities and financial risky decisions.
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Hypothesis 5b. Hypothesis 5b stated that cognitive abilities will be significantly
and negatively related to risky health decision-making, but this relationship will be
moderated by impulsivity, such that impulsivity will decrease the impact o f cognitive
abilities on risky health decision-making (see Figure 4).

Impulsivity

Cognitive Abilities:
Intelligence
Numeric Ability

Risky Health
Decisions

Covariates:
Age
Gender

Figure 4. Hypothesized moderating effects o f impulsivity on the relationship between
cognitive abilities and health risky decisions.
Justification for Hypotheses 5a and 5b
Previous research indicates that impulsivity affects risky decision-making
processes (Crone et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2007; Penolazzi et al., 2012). Additionally,

research suggests that trait impulsivity may influence the type o f decision-making
strategy used by decision-makers. Penolazzi et al. (2012) found that more highly
impulsive individuals have been found to engage in more affective decision-making
compared to deliberative decision-making. These quick, poorly judged and affectively
driven decisions may override one’s ability to engage in thorough and deliberate
cognitive processes such as those required in this study. Accordingly, it was predicted
that higher levels of trait impulsivity would negatively affect one’s ability to engage in
deliberative reasoning and thus reduce the strength o f the relationship between cognitive
abilities and domain-specific risky decision-making. Moreover, it was predicted that
those individuals with higher trait impulsivity would make more risky decisions than
those participants with lower levels o f trait impulsivity.

CHAPTER TWO
METHOD
Pilot Study
In order to measure domain specific risky decision-making, hypothetical risk
taking scenarios were created and pilot tested. The risky decision-making literature was
reviewed, and in particular, items and scenarios that investigators have used to measure
risky decision-making were examined (Mahoney, Buboltz, Levin, Doverspike, &
Svyantek, 2011). In line with similar research, twenty hypothetical risky scenarios were
created,

10

o f which assessed risky financial decisions and

10

o f which assessed risky

health-related decisions (See Appendix G). In order to remain consistent with DOSPERT
Health/Safety items, the health items also included safety behavior, such as wearing
sunscreen for example. Issue involvement was induced in each scenario in order to make
the decisions more salient to the respondent, as previous research indicates that issue
involvement affects the decision-making process (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Likewise,
numeric information including percentages, base rates, and timelines were included in the
scenarios as research indicates that numeric ability affects the decision-making process
(Lipkus et al., 2001). Participants were instructed to read each hypothetical risky scenario
and choose between two options, A or B, one o f which reflected higher risk and the other
o f which reflected lower risk. High and low risk options were counterbalanced among
scenarios such that option A did not always indicate high risk. Participants were informed
that there were no right or wrong answers. High risk options were assigned a value o f one
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and low risk options were assigned a value o f zero. Domain-specific riskiness was
calculated by summing the corresponding domain-specific items to yield an overall
measure o f domain-specific risky decision-making.
The 20 risky decision-making hypothetical scenarios were administered to 91
undergraduate students at a mid-sized Southern university. Prior to recruitment, approval
to conduct this research was granted by the Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Announcements regarding the study were made by course instructors in undergraduate
psychology classes. All potential volunteers were informed o f the nature o f the study,
including the expected benefits and possible risks o f participation. Volunteers were
informed o f their right to withdraw participation at any time without penalty.
Data were screened for inclusion criteria and 13 participants were removed from
analysis as they did not meet the age (18+ years) criterion that was clearly stated in the
informed consent. Additionally, data was screened for missing values and participants
with 10% or more missing data were removed from the sample (N = 10). The final
sample consisted o f 6 8 participants, 43 females (63%) and 24 males (35%). One
participant did not indicate their gender. Participants ranged in age from 1 8 - 5 6 years (M
= 25.43, SD = 8.63). Twenty-seven participants identified as seniors (39.7%), followed
by 23 M aster’s level (33.8%), six juniors ( 8 .8 %), five sophomores (7.4%), and four
freshmen (5.9%), respectively. The ethnic distribution was restricted, with the majority o f
participants identifying as Caucasian (70.6%), followed by African American (16.2%),
Hispanic (5.9%), Asian/Pacific Islander (4.4%), and “Other” (1.5%). The participant who
identified as “Other” indicated that they were o f mixed ethnicity. Two participants did
not report their ethnic identity.
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Participant responses were analyzed for response variability, where variability
indicated that participants responded to scenarios in different ways. All items yielded
response variability. Table 1 displays these findings. Next, the 20 risky decision-making
items were administered to an expert panel for review. The expert panel consisted o f
faculty and doctoral level students (N = 5), including individuals not associated with the
current study. Experts were provided with the following definitions o f risky and risky
decision-making: “Risky refers to exposure to something that has the potential to cause
danger, harm, or loss. Risky decision-making then refers to how an individual navigates a
choice situation that has the potential to cause harm, danger, or loss, yet at the same time,
provides an opportunity to obtain an outcome that is perceived as positive or favorable.”
Expert reviewers were instructed to read each scenario and using a 5-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 7(Not at all risky and/or not representative o f risk domain) to
5(Highly risky and/or representative o f risk domain), to indicate the degree to which each
item represented a health or financial risky decision. Mean riskiness o f each scenario was
calculated and presented in Table 1.
Based on the results o f the pilot study and review by the expert panel, the final
risky decision-making scenarios were reduced from

2 0

to

11

hypothetical scenarios (see

Appendix A). The Health risky decisions were reduced to six scenarios, and the Finance
risky decisions were reduced to five scenarios that were most highly rated by the expert
panel. High risk items were worth one point and low risk items were worth zero points.
Domain-specific scenarios were summed, with higher scores indicating greater domainspecific risky decision-making. The health domain risky decision scenarios yielded a
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Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient o f - .188 and the financial domain risky decision
scenarios yielded a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient o f - .220.
Table 1
Risky Decision-Making Scenarios Descriptive Statistics
Item

1

2

3
4
5
6

7
8

9
10

11

12

13
14
15
16
17

Option
(A and B)

Frequency

A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A '
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B

50
18
2 0

48
17
51
19
49
13
55

Percent(%)

73.5
26.5
29.4
70.6
25.0
75.0
27.9
72.1
19.1
80.9

8

1 1 .8

60
16
52
7
61
64
4

8 8 .2

23.5
76.5
10.3
89.7
94.1
5.9

8

1 1 .8

60
2 2

46
49
19
30
38
28
40
35
33
11

57
2 2

46

Item Mean

KR-2
Delet

3.4

.6 6

2 .8

.44

3.2

.43

2 .6

.42

3.4

.45

2 .6

.45

2 .8

.38

3.0

.43

4.0

.55

4.8

.41

4.2

.19

4.4

.2 2

4.2

.2 0

3.0

.04

3.4

.13

2.4

.07

4.0

.1 2

8 8 .2

32.4
67.6
72.1
27.9
44.1
55.9
41.2
58.8
51.5
48.5
16.2
83.8
32.4
67.6
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18
19
2 0

A
B
A
B
A
B

48
2 0

18
50
10

58

70.6
29.4
26.5
73.5
14.7
85.3

4.0

.29

4.0

.03

3.4

.06

Note. Frequency = number o f participants who endorsed item choice A or B. Percent (%)
= percentage o f participants who endorsed item choice A or B. Item Mean = mean
riskiness o f scenario as rated by expert panel, ranging from /(N ot at all risky and/or not
representative o f risk domain) to 5(Highly risky and/or representative o f risk domain).
KR-20 if Deleted = Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient if item were deleted from
set. The first ten items are financial domain risky scenarios. Refer to Appendix A to
review measure.
Sample and Participant Selection
Several inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied. All participants were
required to be o f legal age to consent to research participation. Participants were also
required to complete the survey packets during one o f the specified time slots available.
Participants were required to be within the age limits under investigation, which were 18
- 30 and 55 - 89 years o f age. No participants were excluded from the final sample due
to age. Participants were required to complete the informed consent form and no
participants were removed from the sample due to non-consent. Any participant who
scored within the impaired range (IQ below 70) on the Shipley-2 would have been
removed from the sample; however, no participants scored within this range. Finally,
those participants who had 15% or more missing data on any given measure were
excluded (N = 9). A power analysis was conducted in order to calculate the sample size
required to detect a medium-sized effect with a power level o f .95. Based on this analysis,
107 participants were recommended in order to achieve a medium sized effect o ff =
0.15 with a power level of p = 0.95. Similarly, Green (1991) argues that if a researcher
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seeks to test the overall fit of a regression model, R , then the following formula should
be used to determine the minimum sample size, 50 + 8 k, where k indicates the number o f
predictors in the model. He also suggests that if investigators seek to test the individual
predictors in the model then the following formula should be used, 104 + k, where k
again refers to the number o f predictors. Based on these formulas, the target minimum
sample size was estimated at 106 - 111. The initial sample consisted o f 143 adults and
eleven participants were removed due to excessive missing data.
The final sample included 133 adults. The younger adult sample, aged 18-30
years, consisted o f 108 (81.2%) adults from a midsized southern United States university.
Comparatively, the older adult sample, aged 55-89 years, consisted o f 25 (18.8%)
participants from two older adult fitness programs located in the southern and
Midwestern United States. The final sample consisted o f 80 (60.2%) females, 52 (39.1%)
males, and one transgender (0.8%) individual. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 83
years (M = 29.01, SD = 20.35). The ethnic distribution was restricted, where 108 (81.2%)
participants were Caucasian/White, 17 (12.8%) were African American/Black, four
(3.0%) were Asian, three (2.3%) were Native American, and one participant (0.8%)
identified as “Other”, and this participants self-reportedly identified as Hispanic. Twentyfour (18.0%) participants indicated that they had previously been diagnosed with
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.
Younger Adult Sample
Younger adult participants (18-30years) were recruited from undergraduate
psychology courses at a southern US university. Permission to sample participants from
these courses was obtained prior to participant recruitment.
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Older Adult Sample
Older adult participants (55-89 years) were recruited from older adult fitness
programs tailored to the specific needs and abilities o f community-dwelling older adults.
One program was run through a southern US university’s Department o f Kinesiology and
the other was run through a Midwestern parks and recreation organization. Permission to
sample participants from these programs was obtained prior to participant recruitment.
Measures
Demographic Survey
Participants answered several questions pertaining to demographic characteristics.
These questions included participant age, race/ethnicity, gender, education level, annual
household income, marital status, employment status, as well as other personal
information. Additionally, participants answered three questions about their financial
independence, political orientation, and level o f religiosity using 5-point Likert-type
scales (See Appendix B).
Impulsiveness Questionnaire (I7)
The I7 (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978) consists o f 54 questions and three subscales,
Impulsiveness, Venturesome, and Empathy. Impulsiveness refers to the tendency to act
without much thought and failing to realize the risk involved in such behavior.
Venturesome refers to the tendency to act, despite knowledge o f the inherent risk in such
behavior. Empathy refers to “a vicarious emotional response to the perceived emotional
experiences o f others” (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972, p.525). The I7 uses a true/false
response format (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, and Allsopp
(1985) reported good internal consistency reliability for the Impulsiveness subscale for
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males and females, 0.84 and 0.83, respectively. They also found good internal
consistency reliability for the Venturesomeness subscale in males and females, 0.85 and
0.84, respectively. Finally, they found acceptable internal consistency reliability, 0.69, for
the Empathy subscale for males and females (Eysenck et al., 1985). The I 7 also has good
test-retest reliabilities for men and women on the Venturesomeness (.078) and
Impulsiveness (0.90) scales. The I7 also has moderate to strong correlations with similar
measures o f impulsiveness, such as the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory (0.37 - 0.34), the
BIS/BAS Scales (0.26 - 0.58), and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (0.52 - 0.58). Thus,
the I7 has adequate convergent validity (Miller et al., 2004; See Appendix C). For the
purposes o f this study, only the Impulsiveness subscale was included in the statistical
model.
Domain-Specific Risk Taking Scale (DOSPERT)
The DOSPERT (Weber et al., 2002) consists o f 40 questions and two major
scales, Risk Behavior and Risk Perception (Blais & Weber, 2006). Risky behavior and
perceptions o f risk are measured across five domains: Ethical, Health/Safety, Recreation,
Finance, and Social. These domains were selected because they represent common areas
o f risk taking.
For the purposes o f this study, only the financial and health/safety domain
questions were administered to the participants. Each domains consists o f eight questions,
thus participants answered 16 o f the 40 questions. Respondents were required to answer
each question three times, once as it pertained to risk behavior and twice as it related to
risk perception. For the Risk Behavior scale, participants are asked to indicate on a 5point Likert scale, from 1( Very unlikely) to 5(Very likely), the likelihood that they would
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engage in the stated behavior. Comparatively, the Risk Perception scale asked
participants to rate on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1(Not at all risky) to 5{Extremely risky)
how risky each behavior was perceived to be. Likewise, participants were asked to rate
the expected benefits o f each scenario on a 5-point Likert scale from 1(No benefits at all)
to 5(Great benefits) (Weber et al., 2002).
Weber et al. (2002) found that the Risk Behavior and Risk Perception scales have
good internal consistency reliability, 0.88 and 0.89, respectively. They found that the
Financial and Social subscales of the Risk Behavior scale had low test-retest reliabilities,
0.44 and 0.58, respectively, while the Health, Ethics, and Recreation subscales had
respectable test-retest reliabilities, 0.75, 0.72, and 0.80, respectively. A similar trend was
found when they examined the Risk Perception subscales, where Financial and Social
(0.42 and 0.47, respectively) were less stable than the Health, Ethics, and Recreation
subscales (0.66, 0.67, and 0.56, respectively) (Weber et al., 2002).
Weber et al. (2002) reported that the Risk Behavior subscales o f the DSOPERT
had good convergent validity with similar measures. For instance, Budner’s (1962) Scale
for intolerance o f ambiguity correlated with all o f the Risk Behavior subscales o f the
DOSPERT, suggesting adequate convergent validity. Likewise, all Risk Behavior
subscales correlated highly with measures o f sensation seeking, such as Zuckerman’s
(1994) Sensation-seeking scale, suggesting good convergent validity (Weber et al., 2002;
See Appendix D).
Shipley-2
The Shipley-2 (Shipley, Gruber, Martin, & Klein, 2009) is a brief measure o f
fluid and crystalized intelligence that provides an estimate o f general cognitive ability
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and functioning. The Shipley-2 is self-administered and takes approximately 20 to 25
minutes to complete and can be administered individually or within group settings. It has
been normed on a large population o f children and adults from the ages o f seven to 89
years. In order to complete this assessment, the examinee must have a fourth grade
reading level. The Shipley-2 provides both composite fluid and crystallized intelligence
scores as well as an overall score o f cognitive ability. Additionally, the Shipley-2
includes an index o f impairment to screen for cognitive impairments. Crystallized
intelligence is measured by the Vocabulary scale, whereas fluid intelligence can be
measured using either the Abstraction or Block Patterns scales. The Abstraction scale
consists o f 25 numeric and alpha puzzles to be solved by the examinee. The Block
Patterns scale is a nonverbal measure o f fluid reasoning where participants solve patterns
based on block representations. Examinees are given a maximum o f 10 minutes to
complete the Verbal scale, 12 minutes to complete the Abstraction scale, and 10 minutes
to complete the Block Patterns scale (Shipley et al., 2009).
The Shipley-2 scales and composite scores have good to excellent internal
consistency reliabilities. All reliability scores are reported for adults aged 17 - 89 years.
The Vocabulary scale has internal consistency reliabilities that range from 0.85 to 0.92.
The Abstraction scale has internal consistency reliabilities ranging from 0.66 to 0.91. The
Block Patterns scale has internal consistency reliabilities ranging from 0.74 to 0.94. The
Vocabulary + Abstraction Composite (Composite A) score ranges from 0.88 to 0.97,
whereas the Vocabulary + Block Patterns Composite (Composite B) score ranges from
0.91 to 0.95. The authors also reported good test-retest reliabilities for the Vocabulary,
Abstraction, and Block Patterns scales, 0.94, 0.87, and 0.90, respectively. Composite A
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and B scores also yielded excellent test-retest reliabilities, 0.94 and 0.93, respectively
(Shipley et al., 2009). The Shipley-2 also has moderate to strong correlations with the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Ill (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997). Shipley et al. (2009)
note that the correlation strength is partially related to the content o f the various scales
under comparison. The Shipley-2 composite scores and the WAIS-III Full Scale IQ
(FSIQ) have strong positive correlations, suggesting that the Shipley-2 measures similar
components of intelligence as the Wechsler system.
In this study, participants completed the Verbal and Block Patterns scales. The
Block Patterns scale was selected because it generally has greater internal consistency
reliability than the Abstraction scale and takes less time to complete. The Composite B
score was used as a measure o f general cognitive abilities.
Numeracy Scale
The Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) consists o f two scales, the General
Numeracy Scale and the Expanded Numeracy Scale. The General Numeracy scale
consists o f three items, each one separately assessing probability, percentage, and
proportion numeric ability. These questions are open-ended. Alpha reliabilities for the
general items ranged from .57 to .63. The Expanded Numeracy scale consists o f seven
items that examine probability, percentage, and proportion numeric abilities within the
context o f health risks. These questions utilize both multiple choice and open-ended
response formats. Lipkus et al. (2001) reported that this scale is best interpreted as a
unidimensional measure, which indicates that both scales assess global numeric ability.
Alpha reliabilities for the Expanded scale ranged from .70 to .75 (Lipkus et al., 2001; See
Appendix E).
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form C
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form C is a measure of
social desirable responding, or the perceived need o f the respondent to respond to test
items in a culturally appropriate and acceptable manner in order to gain social approval.
Thus, this scale measures a respondent’s tendency to “fake good” or “fake bad” on
questionnaire responses (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale Short Form C was adapted from the original Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The short form consists o f 13 true or false
statements, o f which eight are keyed true and five false. The original scale yielded high
internal consistency, .8 8 , and test-retest reliability o f .89. Additionally, the original
measure correlated moderately with the validity scales o f the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI), which also measure aspects o f socially desirable
responding and suggests good convergent validity. The short form also yields moderate
correlations (- .52 - .59) with the MMPI validity scales, suggesting good convergent
validity (Robinette, 1991). The short form c yields good reliability, r = .76, and correlates
highly with the original form, r = .93,/? < .001. Thus, the Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale Short Form C is a reliable and valid measure o f socially desirable
responding (See Appendix F).
Risky-Decision Scenarios
Eleven financial and health-related risky decision scenarios were be created by
the investigator to measure domain-specific risky decision-making. Participants were
required to read each scenario and choose between two decision options, A or B, one o f
which reflected higher risk and the other which reflected lower risk. The response options
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were coded, where

0

= less risky and

1

= more risky, and domain-specific risk taking was

represented by summing the health and finance scenarios. Higher scores indicated greater
domain-specific risk taking. (See Appendix H).
Procedure
Prior to participant recruitment, approval from the Institutional Review Board was
granted to conduct this research. Ethical standards for human research were followed and
participation in this study was voluntary. Participants were informed o f their right to
discontinue participation at any point without penalty. No personally identifiable
information was kept and privacy o f the participants was maintained. Informed consent
forms and survey packets were collected separately in order to ensure anonymity. The
survey packets were only accessible to the primary investigator, research assistants, and
dissertation chair o f this study. Survey packets were stored in secure environments.
In order to recruit younger adults, undergraduate psychology professors were
notified o f this study and asked if the primary investigator could post a flyer about this
study onto the course website. Flyers provided brief information about his study,
including dates and times for participation. Some professors may have offer extra course
credit to students for research participation.
In order to recruit the older adults, permission to announce this study during
fitness classes will first be obtained from the Adult Fitness Program Directors. Fitness
class instructors were notified o f this study and granted permission for the investigator or
research assistants to make announcements in fitness classes. Interested volunteers were
provided with information regarding this study, including times and dates for study
participation.
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Volunteers presented at a specified location in order to complete a survey packet.
Data were collected over several recruitment days that spanned ten months. Participants
completed the survey packets in one sitting. Surveys were administered to groups o f
participants ranging from one to twenty volunteers. Survey packets were administered in
rooms without computers or other electronic devices, in order to deter cheating on the
cognitive and computational components o f the study. Upon arrival, participants were
given a survey packet, including the informed consent form. Participants were instructed
to read and sign the informed consent form prior to further participation. Participants
were allowed to use those materials that were required to complete these measures,
namely, a pencil and eraser. All participants completed the Shipley-2 first, as there were
general instructions regarding the entire test as well as the subtests. Additionally, these
were timed tests and having all participants complete the subtests at the same time
ensured that participants did not use extended time, which would invalidate their scores.
All instructions were read verbatim to participants (see Appendices I and J). Participants
first heard general instructions about this study and then were introduced to the Shipley-2
cognitive tests. Next, the participants were read the instructions for the Verbal test.
Participants had 10 minutes to complete the verbal test, at which point they were
instructed to stop working. Next, the participants were read the instructions for the Block
Patterns test. The participants had 10 minutes to complete the Block Patterns test, at
which point they were instructed to stop working. Participants were reminded that they
had unlimited time to complete the remaining measures in the survey packet. The
remaining measures were counterbalanced in the survey packet. Participants required
approximately 3 0 - 6 0 minutes to complete the survey packets.

CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS
Data were analyzed using Chronbach’s coefficient alpha, the Kuder-Richardson
reliability coefficient, Independent -sam ples t tests, the Mann-Whitney U test, one-way
analysis o f variance (ANOVA), and multiple regression analysis. Data were first
screened for missing values and outliers, which were replaced using the person-mean
substitution method, as it is an effective way o f replacing missing data (Downey & King,
1998). Influential cases and outliers were assessed, which will be discussed below as
they pertain to each analysis. Four outliers were detected and removed from the analyses
conducted in hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, two multivariate outliers were detected
using Mahalanobis distance and removed. Additionally, two univariate outliers were
detected and removed (Field, 2009; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).
Cronbach’s alpha was used to examine scale reliability. The DOSPERT (Weber et
al., 2002) overall scale reliability was .69. The separate dimensions achieved a mean
reliability o f .76, ranging from .73 to .78. The Risk Taking subscale yielded an acceptable
reliability o f .73 (Cortina, 1993). The Risk Perception subscale also yielded an acceptable
reliability o f .76. Finally, the Expected Benefits subscale yielded the highest reliability o f
.78, which is also considered acceptable (Cortina, 1993). Finally, the internal reliability
of the Impulsiveness subscale o f the I7 (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978) was also calculated
using Cronbach’s alpha, which yielded an acceptable reliability o f .78 (Cortina, 1993).
The Kuder-Richardson 20 (Kuder & Richardson, 1937) was used to examine the domain
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specific risky decision scenarios reliabilities, as these scenarios use forced choice
dichotomous responses. The health scenarios yielded a reliability o f .195 and the finance
scenarios yielded a reliability o f .103. Additionally, variable descriptive statistics are
included in Table 2.
Table 2
Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable

M

SD

Risk Taking

35.14

8.69

Risk Perception

60.15

Expected Benefits

Reliability

Skew

Kurt

.73

2.82

-.0 1 2

8.17

.76

-1.99

.231

31.85

7.43

.78

1.37

-.922

Impulsiveness

7.64

4.45

.78

3.81

3.79

Numeracy

7.91

2.52

—

-3.73

-.454

Intelligence

105.89

12.16

—

-2 . 0 2

-.043

Health

1.74

1.16

.19

1.54

.316

Finance

1 .0 0

.891

.1 0

2.71

-1.08

Note. M = mean. SD = standard deviation. Skew = skewness. Kurt = kurtosis.
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to assess group differences on the
independent and moderating variables as stated in hypotheses 1 and 2. Parametric
assumptions were assessed prior to analysis. The assumptions o f interval level data and
independence were satisfied. Normality was assessed using several methods, including
the Kolmogorov-Smimov test, skewness and kurtosis scores, as well as visual inspection
o f histograms with normality plots and p-p plots (Field, 2009; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).
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Aside from the DOSPERT Risk Taking and Risk Perception variables, all other variables
failed the assumption o f normality. Accordingly, a square root transformation was
applied to correct for non-normally distributed data (Field, 2009). Several variables,
including: Numeracy, Block Design, Finance Domain Risky Decisions, and Health
Domain Risky Decisions, were not sufficiently corrected to satisfy the assumption o f
normality. Additionally, homogeneity o f variance was assessed using the Levene’s
statistic and one analysis did not satisfy this assumption (older and younger adult risk
taking behavior comparison). Accordingly, non-parametric tests such as the MannWhitney U test were used to assess group differences, as such tests are assumption free
(Field, 2009). Bivariate correlations among the study variables are presented in Tables 3
and 4.
Table 3

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 Gen

.16

-.24**

-.28**

-.19*

-.07*

-.41**

.35**

-.24**

2 Age

—

-.26*

.2 1 *

.07

-.36**

_ 4 7 **

.36**

-.36**

.1 0

.08

.32**

**

-.28**

.35**

-.06

.08

-.2 0 **

.1 1

2 7 * *

CO
O

.1 2

3 Heal
4 Num
5 IQ
6

Imp

7 RT
8

RP

9 EB

1

—

—

4 9

**

—

4 9

-.16

.05

-.19*

©
o

Measure

—

—

r

2

*

Bivariate Correlations fo r Health Decisions

-.54**

.69**

—

-.40**
—
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Note. Correlations between continuous variables indicate Pearson product moment
correlations. Those between a continuous and dichotomous variable indicate a pointbiserial correlation. Gen = participant gender. Age = participant age. Heal = health
domain total score. Num = numeracy. IQ = total estimated intelligence. Imp = trait
impulsivity. RT = DOSPERT risk taking behavior subscale score. RP = DOSPERT
risk perception subscale score. EB = DOSPERT expected benefits subscale score.
A = 129; */? < .05; **p < .01.
Table 4
Bivariate Correlations fo r Financial Decisions
2

3

4

5

6

1 Gender

.16

-.04

-.28**

-.19*

-.07

2 Age

—

.03

.2 1 *

.07

-.36**

—

.15

.06

.16

Measure

3 Finance

—

4 Num
5 IQ
6

Impuls

RP

4 9

**

—

7 RT Beh
8

1

7

8

9

41 **

.35**

-.25**

_ 4 7 **

.36**

-.37**

**

-.07

.19*

-.06

.08

_

2 3

-.16

.05

-.19*

-.0 0

—

_ 2 3

.27**
—

**

-.03
.

5 4

**

—

.1 1

.1 2

.6 8 **
_ 41**
—

9 EB

Note. Correlations between continuous variables indicate Pearson product moment
correlations. Correlations between a continuous and dichotomous variable indicate a
point-biserial correlation. Gender = participant gender. Age = participant age. Finance=
financial domain total score. Num = numeracy. IQ = total estimated intelligence. Impuls
= trait impulsivity. RT Beh = DOSPERT risk taking behavior subscale score. RP =
DOSPERT risk perception subscale score. EB = DOSPERT expected benefits subscale
score.
N = 129; *p < .05; **p < .01.
Across both types o f risky decision domains (health and finance), males scored
higher on measures of numeracy, intelligence, risk taking (attitudes toward risk), and
expected benefits o f risk. Comparatively, across the health and finance domains, females
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scored more highly on measures o f risk perception. Similarly, across health and financial
domains, older adults scored higher on measures o f numeracy and risk perception than
younger adults, while younger adults had higher levels o f trait impulsivity, risk taking,
and expected benefits o f risky behavior (see Tables 3 and 4).
For risky health decisions, there were a number o f correlations among study
variables. Males had higher levels o f trait impulsivity and made more risky health
decisions (r = -.235) than females. Younger adults made more risky health decisions
(r = -.255) than older adults. There were significant and positive relationships among
impulsivity and risk taking, indicating that people who were more impulsive were more
likely to engage in risky behavior. There was a significant, positive relationship between
numeracy and intelligence, indicating that those participants with greater numeracy skills
also had higher intelligence. Intelligence and impulsivity were significantly, negatively
related, indicating that participants o f higher levels o f intelligence had lower levels of
trait impulsivity. Impulsivity and risk taking were positively related, which indicates that
participants with greater trait impulsivity were more likely to take risks. Risk taking and
expected benefits (r = .687) o f risky behavior were also significantly, positively related,
indicating that those who perceived more possible benefits o f engaging in risky behavior
were more likely to endorse risk taking. Risk perception was negatively related to risk
taking (r = -.539) and expected benefits (r = -.406) o f risky behavior, indicating that
participants who perceived more risk were less likely to make risks or expect benefits o f
risky behavior (see Table 3).
There were also several correlations among study variables related to risky
financial decisions. There were significant, positive relationships among financial risky
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decisions, risk taking (r = .231), and expected benefits (r - .193), indicating that those
participants who expected greater benefits o f risky financial behavior and endorsed
greater risk taking behavior made more risky financial decisions. There was also a
significant, positive relationship between numeracy and intelligence, where participants
who had greater numeracy skills were also o f higher intelligence. Intelligence was
negatively related to impulsivity and risk perception, where participants o f higher
intelligence were less impulsive and perceived less risk in various risky scenarios. Risk
taking and impulsivity (r = .230) were significantly and positively related, which
indicates that participants who endorsed more trait impulsivity also endorsed more risk
taking. Risk perception and risk taking (r = -.406) were significantly and negatively
related, which indicates that participants who perceived greater risk endorsed less risk
taking behavior. Expected benefits o f risk taking (r - .678) were significantly, positively
related; those who perceived greater possible benefits o f risky behavior endorsed greater
risk taking behavior. Finally, there was a significant, negative relationship between risk
perception and expected benefits {r - -.539); participants who perceived greater risk
expected greater possible benefits o f risky behavior (see Table 4).
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that males and females will differ in the number o f risky
domain-specific decisions they make.
Hypothesis la
Males will make more risky financial decisions than females. The Mann-Whitney
U Test was used to compare males and females on financial risky decisions. Males
= 70.11) and females (MRank= 64.16) did not significantly differ on the number o f risky
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financial decisions that they made, U = 1892.50, z = -.925, p = . 178, r - -.020. Therefore,
males did not make significantly more risky financial decisions compared to females.
Thus, hypothesis la is not supported.
Hypothesis lb
Males will make more risky health decisions than females. The Mann-Whitney U
Test was used to compare males and females on risky health decisions. Males and
females significantly differed on the number o f risky health decisions that they made, U =
1663.50, z = -.1.999 , p = .023, r = - .173, where males (.MRank = 74.51) made significantly

more risky health decisions compared to females (MRa„k = 61.29). Thus, hypothesis lb is
supported.
H ypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that younger adults would make significantly more domainspecific risky decisions than older adults. The Mann-Whitney U Test was used to
compare older and younger adults on domain-specific risky decisions. Older and
younger adults significantly differed on the number o f risky health decisions they made,
U= 929.00, z = -2.498, p = .012, r = -.216, where younger adults (MRank = 70.90) made
significantly more risky health decisions than older adults (M ^n k= 50.16).
Comparatively, older (M Rank = 69.46) and younger (MRank = 66.43) adults did not
significantly differ on the number o f risky financial decisions that they made, U =
1288.50, z = -.375, p = .718, r

=

-.032. Thus, hypothesis 2 was partially supported.

Parametric assumptions for regression analysis were tested and violations o f
assumptions are discussed in each moderation analysis. Normality o f residuals were
assessed using several methods, including visual inspection o f the P-P plots, histograms
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with normal curves, the Kolmogorov-Smimov test, skewness, and kurtosis. Several
variables failed the assumption o f residual normality as discussed below. Linearity and
homoscedasticity were assessed via visual inspection o f the residual scatterplots, with
rectangular plots indicating homoscedasticity. Several variables failed the assumption of
homoscedasticity as discussed below. Tabachnick and Fidel (2013) note that failure o f
such assumptions does not necessarily invalidate regression analysis so much as it
weakens the results because these violations have been shown to have little to no adverse
effects on the analysis. Similarly, Bohmstedt and Carter (1971) note that regression
analysis is robust; violations o f normality and homoscedasticity generally do not lead to
significant statistical distortions because the distribution o f the errors tends to be
normally distributed despite the shape o f the original distribution. Thus, regression
analysis were conducted when variables failed these assumptions and are discussed in the
limitations o f this study. Multicolinearity was assessed using various methods, including
visual inspection o f correlation matrices, the variance inflation factor (VIF), and the
tolerance statistic. The Durbin Watson statistic was used to assess for independent errors.
Finally, all data were either categorical or quantitative, which satisfied the assumptions
related to variable types (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013).
Hypotheses 3-5 were examined using a hierarchical regression analysis and the
steps identified by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004). First, all predictor and moderator
variables were standardized. Next, interaction terms were created using the new
standardized variables (impulsivity x numeracy, impulsivity x IQ, risk taking x
numeracy, risk taking x IQ, risk perception x numeracy, risk perception x IQ, expected
benefits x numeracy, and expected benefits x IQ). Eight separate moderation analyses
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were conducted to test the effects o f each moderator using a block entry design. A
Bonferroni adjustment was used to control the family-wise Type I error rate when testing
regression coefficients with a corrected criterion o f significance o f p < .00625 (Field,
2009; Mundfrom, Perrett, Schaffer, Piccone, & Roozeboom, 2006). In the first step, age
and gender were entered as control variables. In the second step, the independent
variables (numeracy and IQ) and the moderator variables (impulsivity, risk taking, risk
perception, expected benefits) were entered. In the third and final step, the associated
interaction terms were entered (see above). The sections below present the results for
each moderation analysis.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Risk Perception, Risk
Taking, and Expected Benefits) will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities
(total estimated intelligence and numeracy) and risky financial decisions.
Hypothesis 3a
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, perception o f financial risk
will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and risky financial decision-making. Three multivariate outliers were
discovered. Regression analyses were conducted with and without these outliers to
determine their effect on the overall statistical model. Removal o f these outliers had no
significant impact on residual normality or the regression analysis, and thus they were not
removed. The financial risk standardized residuals, D( 133) = .098, p = .003, ZSkeWness =
.636, Zkurtosis= - 1-592, were significantly non-normal and thus failed the KolmogorovSmimov test o f normality. According to Field (2009), large samples with small standard
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errors may produce significant deviations from normality. Thus, he argues that for
samples o f this size, a z-score cutoff o f ±2.58 should be used to assess for significant
deviations o f normality. According to this standard, the residuals were approximately
normally distributed. The data failed the assumption o f homoscedasticity. Several
investigators argue that moderate heteroscedasticity does not invalidate regression results,
rather it weakens the results (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).
Moreover, Borhntedt and Carter (1971) argued that regression analysis is robust to
violations o f homoscedasticity. The assumptions o f no multicollinearity and independent
errors were satisfied. Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Risk Perception as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and
Financial Domain Risky Decisions
Ba

SE B

PD

t

.0 0 2

.004

.039

.444

-.006,

-.155

.160

-.086

-.972

-.472, .161

.0 0 2

.004

.039

.410

-.007, .010

Gender

-.038

.174

-.0 2 1

-.216

-.382, .307

Numeracy

.136

.096

.148

1.408

-.055, .326

IQ

-.068

.097

-.701

-.261,. 124

Risk
Perception

-.115

.093

-.1 2 0

-1.236

-.300, .069

.0 0 1

.004

.030

.313

-.007, .010

Step 1

R1

AR1

.008

.008

Age
Gender
Step 2

.033

Age

Step 3
Age

.072

95% Cl

.0 1 0

.026

i
o

Variable

.039

85

Gender

-.024

.172

-.013

-.138

-.364, .317

Numeracy

.155

.097

.169

1.603

-.036, .346

IQ

-.079

.097

-.083

-.820

-.271, .112

Risk
Perception

-.132

.093

-.137

-1.419

-.315, .052

NumxRiskPer

-.069

.1 1 0

-.071

-.622

-.278,.150

IQxRiskPer

.225

.109

.236*

2.071

.010, .440

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Risk Perception = DOSPERT Risk Perception, NumxRiskPer =
interaction between numeracy and risk perception, IQxRiskPer = interaction between
total estimated intelligence and risk perception.
a Unstandardized regression weight. Standardized beta weight.
The results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not
significantly account for variance in risky financial decisions, R2= .008, R2adj = - .007,
F(2,130) = .513,/? = .600, as presented in Table 5. In the second step, cognitive abilities
(numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and risk perception did not significantly
contributed to the variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2= .026, p = .342,
F{5, 127) = .880,/? = .496. In the third step, the interactions between cognitive abilities
(numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and risk perception did not significantly
contribute to the amount o f variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 = .039,
Fchangei2, 125) = 2.596,/? = .079. Based on these results, hypothesis 3a was not supported.
Hypothesis 3b
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, attitudes towards (risk taking)
financial risk will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and
total estimated intelligence) and risky financial decisions. Eight multivariate outliers were
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identified. Moderation analysis was run with and without them to determine their
influence on the overall model statistics. Removal o f these outliers did not have a
significant impact on residual normality or the regression analysis, and thus were not
removed. The financial risk standardized residuals, D( 125) = .126,/? < .001, ZSkeWness 2.594, Zkurtosis= - 090, were significantly non-normal according to the KolmogorovSmimov test o f normality. Field’s (2009) z-score cutoff o f ± 2.58 was utilized to
determine residual normality. Moreover, several investigators note that moderate
violations o f residual normality do not invalidate regression analysis, as regression is
robust to violations o f normality (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Thus, the residuals were approximately normally distributed.
The assumptions o f no multicollinearity and independent errors were satisfied. Results o f
the moderation analysis are presented in Table 6 .
Table

6

Risk Taking as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and
Financial Domain Risky Decisions
Variable

R

AR1

.008

.008

B*

SE B

Pb

t

.0 0 2

.004

.039

.444

-.006,

-.155

.160

-.086

-.972

-.472,. 161

Age

.006

.004

.140

1.400

-.003,-015

Gender

.089

.175

.049

.511

-.256, .435

Numeracy

.1 1 1

.094

.1 2 1

1.186

-.074, .297

-.029

.093

-.030

-.314

-.213, .155

Step 1
Age
Gender
Step 2

IQ

.085

95% Cl

.0 1 0

.078*
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Risk Taking

.307

.103

.309*

2.970

.102, .511

Age

.007

.005

.152

1.493

-.0 0 2 , .016

Gender

.115

.176

.064

.654

-.234, .464

Numeracy

.149

.096

.162

1.543

-.042, .340

IQ

-.043

.093

-.045

-.460

-.227,-142

Risk Taking

.310

.106

.312*

2.916

.100,.520

NumxRiskTak

.162

.1 0 1

.162

1.611

-.037, .361

IQxRiskTak

-.097

.097

-.098

-1 .0 0 0

-.290, .095

Step 3

.105

.019

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 -= female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Risk Taking = DOSPERT Risk Taking, NumxRiskTak =
interaction between numeracy and risk taking, IQxRiskTak = interaction between total
estimated intelligence and risk taking.
a Unstandardized regression weight. Standardized beta weight.
*/? < .05.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly
'y

account for any variance in risky financial decisions, R = .008, R adj = - .007, F(2,130) =
.513,p = .600, as presented in Table 6 . In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy
and total estimated intelligence) and risk taking (attitude toward risk) did not significantly
contribute to variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 - .078, Fchange{3, 127) =
3.590,/? =.016, as the criterion o f significance p < .00625 was employed. In the third
step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and risk taking did not significantly contribute to the variance explained in
risky financial decisions, AR = .019, FCf,ange(2, 125) = 1.343,/? = .265. Based on these
results, hypothesis 3b was not supported, as the moderators did not significantly account
for variance in risky financial decisions.
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Hypothesis 3c
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, expected benefits o f risk
financial decisions will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy
and total estimated intelligence) and risky financial decisions. Seven multivariate outliers
were identified. Moderation analysis was run with and without them to determine their
influence on the overall model statistics. Removal o f these outliers had no significant
impact on residual normality or the regression analysis; they were not removed from the
analysis. The financial risk standardized residuals, D(133) = .095,/? = .005, Zskewness=
2.233, Zkurtosis= - 1-340, were significantly non-normal according to the KolmogorovSmimov test o f normality. Field’s (2009) z-score cutoff o f ± 2.58 was utilized to
determine residual normality. Thus, the residuals were approximately normally
distributed. The data also failed the assumption o f homoscedasticity. Several
investigators argue that heteroscedasticity does not invalidate regression as regression
analysis is robust to this type o f violation (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta,
2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The assumptions o f no multicollinearity and
independent errors were satisfied. Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in
Table 7.
Table 7
Expected Benefits as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and
Health Domain Risky Decisions
Variable
Step 1
Age

R2

M 1

.008

.008

¥

SE ~B

p5

/

95% Cl

.002

.004

.039

.444

-.006, .010

89

Gender

-.155

.160

-.086

-.972

-.472, .161

Age

.004

.004

.099

1.024

-.004, .013

Gender

-.010

.168

-.006

-.062

-.343, .332

Numeracy

.108

.095

.117

1.138

-.080, .295

IQ

-.046

.094

-.048

-.495

-.232, .139

Expected
Benefits

.232

.090

.247*

2.582

.054, .411

Age

.005

.004

.110

1.127

-.004, .014

Gender

.008

.169

.004

.045

-.326, .341

Numeracy

.127

.096

.138

1.321

-.063, .317

IQ

-.053

.094

-.055

-.565

-.240, .133

Expected
Benefits

.239

.090

.253*

2.641

.060, .417

NumxExpBen

.130

.100

.121

1.293

-.069, .328

IQxExpBen

-.019

.095

-.019

-.205

-.207, .169

Step 2

.071

Step 3

.083

.063*

.013

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Expected Benefits = DOSPERT Expected Benefits, NumxExpBen
= interaction between numeracy and expected benefits, IQxExpBen = interaction between
total estimated intelligence and expected benefits.
a Unstandardized regression w eight.b Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly
account for variance in finance domain risky decisions, R2 = .0 0 8 ,7?2adj = - .007, F( 2 ,1 3 0 )
= .513,/? = .600, as presented in Table 7. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy

and total estimated intelligence) and expected benefits o f risky behavior did not
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2

significantly account for variance in risky financial decisions, AR = .063, Fchange{3, 127)
= 2.863, p =.039, as the criterion o f significance p < .00625 was employed. In the third
step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and expected benefits did not explain significant variance in risky financial
decisions, AR = .013, FChange(2,125) = .8 6 8 ,/? = .422. Based on these results, hypothesis
3c was not supported because the moderator variables did not significantly account for
any variance in risky financial decisions.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 stated that subscale scores o f the DOSPERT (Risk Perception, Risk
Taking, and Expected Benefits) will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities
(total estimated intelligence and numeracy) and risky health decisions.
Hypothesis 4a
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, perception o f health risk will
moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and risky health decisions. One univariate outlier was identified and
remained in the analysis as it did not have a significant effect on the overall statistical
model. The assumptions o f normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and
independent errors were satisfied. The assumption o f homoscedasticity was not satisfied.
Several investigators argue that heteroscedasticity does not invalidate regression, as it is
robust against moderate violations o f homoscedasticity (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971;
Mertler & Vannatta, 2010 Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation
analysis are presented in Table 8 .
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Table

8

Risk Perception as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and
Health Domain Risky Decisions
Variable
Step 1

R1

AR1

.090

.090*

5a

SE B

(3b

t

95% Cl

Age

-.0 1 2

.005

-.213*

-2.509

-.022, -.003

Gender

-.419

.198

-.180*

-2.119

-.810, -.028

Age

-.0 1 2

.005

-.2 0 0 *

-2.216

-.0 2 2 , - . 0 0 1

Gender

-.226

.213

-.097

-1.060

-.648,.196

Numeracy

.148

.118

.125

1.254

-.086, .381

IQ

-.023

.119

-.018

-.190

-.259, .213

Risk
Perception

-.216

.114

-.174

-1.894

-.442, .010

Age

-.0 1 1

.005

-.191*

-2 . 1 1 1

-. 0 2 1 , - . 0 0 1

Gender

-.239

.213

-.1 0 2

-1 . 1 2 2

-.659,.182

Numeracy

.140

.119

.118

1.175

-.096, .377

IQ

-.0 2 0

.1 2 0

-.016

-.170

-.258, .217

Risk
Perception

-.208

.115

-.168

-1.812

-.435, .019

NumxRiskPer

-.008

.136

-.006

-.057

-.278, .262

IQxRiskPer

-.169

.134

-.137

-1.257

-.435, .097

Step 2

Step 3

.129

.148

.038

.0 2 0

Note. Gender was coded 0 - male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Risk Perception = DOSPERT Risk Perception, NumxRiskPer =
interaction between numeracy and risk perception, IQxRiskPer = interaction between
total estimated intelligence and risk perception.
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a Unstandardized regression w eight.b Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) accounted for 9.0% o f
7

7

the variance in health domain risky decisions, R = .090, R adj= 076, F(2, 130) = 6.464, p
= .002, as presented in Table 8 . In the first step, both age ((3 = -.21,/? = .013) and gender

(P = -. 18, p = .036) had negative relationships with health domain risky decisions. This
indicates that males made more risky health-related decisions than females (gender was
coded

0

for males and

1

for females), and that older adults made fewer risky health

related decisions than younger adults. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy
and total estimated intelligence) and risk perception did not explain significant variance
in health domain risky decisions, AR2 = .038,/? = .142, F (5,127) = 3.746,/? = .003. In the
third step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and risk perception did not significantly account for variance in health
domain risky decisions, AR = .020, Fchange(2, 125) = 1.448,/? = .239. Based on these
results, males and younger adults made more risky health decisions compared to females
and older adults. Given that the moderator did not significantly account for variance in
risky health decisions, hypothesis 4a was not supported.
Hypothesis 4b
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, attitudes towards health risk
will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and risky health decisions. Seven multivariate outliers were identified.
Regression analysis was run with and without these outliers to determine their effect on
the overall model. These outliers significantly affected the regression model and were
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removed. The assumptions o f normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and
independent errors were satisfied. The assumption o f homoscedasticity was not satisfied.
Several investigators argue that moderate violations o f homoscedasticity are permissible,
regression analysis is robust to violations o f this assumption (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971;
Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation
analysis are presented in Table 9.
Table 9
Risk Taking as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and Health
Domain Risky Decisions
Variable

.072

.072*

Tf

SE B

Pb

/

95% Cl

-.167

-1.898

-.020, .000

Age

\

AR1

©
o

Step 1

R1

.005

Gender

-.438

.206

-.187*

-2.122

-.846, -.029

Age

.000

.006

.006

.064

-.011,.012

Gender

-.022

.208

-.009

-.104

-.434, .391

Numeracy

.119

.122

.096

.980

-.122, .360

IQ

.012

.120

.009

.103

-.225, .250

Risk Taking

.691

.136

.487**

5.070

.4 21,.960

-1.387

.006

.000

-.002

-.012, .012

Gender

-.012

.213

-.005

-.056

-.434, .410

Numeracy

.105

.129

.084

.811

-.151, .360

IQ

.031

.127

.023

.241

-.221,.282

Risk Taking

.688

.138

.485**

Step 2

Step 3
Age

.245

.247

174**

.001

4.970

.414, .962

94

NumxRiskTak
IQxRiskTak

-.056

.182

-.033

-.310

-.416, .304

.075

.167

.045

.452

-.255, .406

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Risk Taking = DOSPERT Risk Taking, NumxRiskTak =
interaction between numeracy and risk taking, IQxRiskTak = interaction between total
estimated intelligence and risk taking.
a Unstandardized regression weight. Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05. ** p < .01.
Results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly
account for any of the variance in risky health decisions, R2 - .072, R2acij = .056, F(2, 122)
= 4.700, p = .011, as the criterion o f significance p < .00625 was employed. Results are
presented in Table 9. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and risk taking (attitude toward risk) significantly contributed to the amount
o f variance explained in risky health decisions, AR2=z .174, F c/,a„ge(3, 119) = 9.140 ,p <
.001. Risk taking (attitudes toward risk; p = .48, p < .001) was positively related to risky
health decisions, indicating that as risk taking increased, participants made more risky
health decisions. In contrast, gender (P = -.009,/? = .917), age (p = .006, p = .949),
numeracy (P = .09,/? = .329), and total estimated intelligence (P = .009, p - .918) did not
significantly account for variance in risky health decisions. In the third step, the
interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and
risk taking did not account for variance in health domain risky decisions, AR2 = .0 0 1 ,
Fchangei.2,117) = .105,

= .900. Accordingly, participants with greater risk taking

behavior made more risky health decisions. Given that the moderator variables did not
account for variance in risky health decisions, hypothesis 4b was not supported.
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Hypothesis 4c
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, expected benefits o f risky
health decisions will moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and
total estimated intelligence) and risky health decisions. No multivariate outliers were
identified. The assumptions o f normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and
independent errors were satisfied. The assumption o f homoscedasticity was not satisfied.
Regression analysis is argued to be robust to moderate violations o f homoscedasticity and
thus regression analysis was conducted (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta,
2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in
Table 10.
Table 10
Expected Benefits as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and
Health Domain Risky Decisions
Variable

R2

AR2

.090

.090*

Bi3

SE B

Pb

t

95% Cl

Age

-.0 1 2

.005

-.213*

-2.509

-.022, -.003

Gender

-.419

.198

-.180*

-2.119

-.810, -.028

Age

-.009

.005

-.154

-1 . 6 6 8

-.019, .002

Gender

-.223

.207

-.095

-1.076

-.632,. 187

Numeracy

.109

.117

.092

.932

-.122, .340

IQ

.019

.115

.015

.165

-.209, .247

Expected
Benefits

.302

.1 1 1

.248*

2.719

.082, .521

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

.153

.155

.063*

.002
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Age

-.009

.005

-.150

-1.597

-.019, .002

Gender

-.2 2 2

.209

-.095

-1.061

-.636,-192

Numeracy

.104

.119

.087

.870

-.132, .339

IQ

.025

.117

.0 2 0

.215

-.206, .257

Expected
Benefits

.304

.1 1 2

.249*

2.713

.082, .525

-.0 2 1

.124

-.015

-.169

-.267, .225

.059

.118

.044

.497

-.174, .292

NumxExpBen
IQxExpBen

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Expected Benefits = DOSPERT Expected Benefits, NumxExpBen
= interaction between numeracy and expected benefits, IQxExpBen = interaction between
total estimated intelligence and expected benefits.
a Unstandardized regression weight. b Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05.
The results indicate that the control variables (age and gender) accounted for
9.0% o f the variance in health domain risky decisions, R 2 = .090, R2^ = .076, F(2,130) =
6.464, p = .002, as presented in Table 10. In the first step, both age (P = -.21,/? = .013)
and gender (P = -. 18, p = .036) had significant, negative relationships with risky health
decisions. This indicates that males made more risky health related decisions than
females and that younger adults made more risky health related decisions than older
adults. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence)
and expected benefits significantly contributed to variance explained in health domain
risky decisions, AR2 = .063,/? = .028, F(5,127) = 4.596,/? < .001. Expected benefits (P =
.24, p ~ .007) had a positive relationship with risky health decisions, indicating that as
perceived expected benefits o f risky behavior increased, participants made more risky
health decisions. However, age (p = -.15,/? = .098), gender (P = -.09,/? = .248), numeracy
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(P = .09, p = .353), and total estimated intelligence (P = .01,/? = .869) were not
significantly related to risky health decisions. In the third step, the interactions between
cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and expected benefits did
•y

not add to the variance explained in health domain risky decisions, AR - .002, Fchan^e(2,
125) = .124,/? = .884. Based on these results, males and younger adults made more risky
health decisions than females and older adults. Additionally, as expected benefits o f risky
health decisions increased, participants made more risky health decisions. Given that the
moderator did not significantly account for any o f the variance in risky health decisions,
hypothesis 4c was not supported.
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that impulsivity will moderate the relationship between
cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and domain-specific risky
decisions.
Hypothesis 5a
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, trait impulsivity will moderate
the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence)
and financial risky decisions. Nine multivariate outliers were identified. Moderation
analysis was run with and without them to determine their influence on the overall model
statistics. Multivariate outliers significantly affected the model statistic and were
removed. The financial risk standardized residuals, D(124) = .097,/? = .006,

Z skewness =

2.594, Zkurtosis = -1.102, were significantly non-normal and thus failed the assumption o f
normality. Accordingly, data were transformed using the square root transformation and
reanalyzed for normality, D( 124) = . 1 2 1 ,/? < .0 0 1 , Z skewness = - -783, Z kurtosis = - 2.835,
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which also failed the assumption for residual normality. Given the fact that the
transformed data did not correct the non-normally distribution o f the residuals, the
untransformed data was used in this analysis. Although the data violated the assumption
o f normally distributed errors, regression analysis was conducted as several investigators
argue that regression is robust to moderate violations o f residual normality (Borhntedt &
Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the
moderation analysis are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Impulsivity as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and Financial
Domain Risky Decisions
SE B

t

95% Cl

Age

.004

.004

.922

-.004, .012

Gender

-.053

.159

-.336

-.367, .261

Age

.003

.005

.065

.643

-.006, .012

Gender

.031

.166

.018

.185

-.297, .359

Numeracy

.175

.100

.191

1.741

-.024, .374

IQ

-.049

.099

-.052

-.499

-.244, .146

Impulsivity

.109

.097

.110

1.131

-.082, .301

Age

.004

.005

.086

.829

-.005, .013

Gender

-.012

.169

-.007

-.070

-.346, .322

Numeracy

.157

.101

.171

1.545

-.044, .358

IQ

-.065

.099

-.068

-.650

-.261, .132

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Rz

AR1

.007

.007

.042

.058

.084

i
©

B*

Variable

.035

.016
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Impulsivity

.126

.098

.127

1.289

-.067, .319

Numxlmpuls

.035

.135

.029

.236

-.232, .303

IQxImpuls

-.174

.134

-.145

-1.296

-.493, .092

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy == numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Impulsivity = trait impulsivity, Numxlmpuls = interaction
between numeracy and impulsivity, IQxImpuls = interaction between total estimated
intelligence and impulsivity.
a Unstandardized regression weight. b Standardized beta weight.
The results show that the control variables (age and gender) did not significantly
account for any o f the variance in financial domain risky decisions, R2 = .007, R2^ =
.007, F(2, 121) = .450,/? = .638, as presented in Table 11. In the second step, cognitive
abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and impulsivity did not significantly
contributed to the amount o f variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 = .035,
p = .239, F(5 ,1 1 8 )= 1.037,/? = .399. In the third step, the interactions between cognitive
abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence) and impulsivity did not significantly
contribute to the amount o f variance explained in risky financial decisions, AR2 = .058,
Fchangei2, 116) = .964,/? = .384. Based on these results, age, gender, cognitive abilities,
and impulsivity do not explain variance in risky financial decisions. Accordingly,
Hypothesis 5a was not supported.
Hypothesis 5b
After controlling for the effects o f age and gender, trait impulsivity will moderate
the relationship between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence)
and risky health decisions. Four multivariate outliers were identified. Regression analysis
was run with and without these cases to determine the influence on the regression model.
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Multivariate outliers significantly affected the regression model and were removed. The
assumptions of normally distributed residuals, no multicollinearity, and independent
errors were satisfied. The assumption o f homoscedasticity was not satisfied. Regression
analysis is argued to be robust to moderate violations o f homoscedasticity and thus
regression analysis was conducted (Borhntedt & Carter, 1971; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Results o f the moderation analysis are presented in Table 12.
Table 12
Impulsivity as a Moderator o f the Relationship Between Cognitive Abilities and Health
Domain Risky Decisions
B*

SEB

Pb

t

95% Cl

Age

-.013

.005

-.223*

-2.611

-.023, -.003

Gender

-.469

.2 0 0

-.2 0 0 *

-2.346

-.865, -.073

Age

-.009

.005

-.155

-1.704

-.019, .001

Gender

-.356

.205

-.152

-1.735

-.762, .050

Numeracy

.116

.117

.098

.989

-.116, .348

IQ

.087

.1 2 0

.068

.721

-.151,.325

Impulsivity

.350

.111

.281*

3.156

.130, .559

Age

-.0 1 0

.005

-.168

-1.809

-.0 2 0 ,

Gender

-.307

.2 1 1

-.131

-1.455

-.726, .111

Numeracy

.1 2 2

.118

.103

1.029

-.113, .356

IQ

.087

.1 2 1

.069

.722

-.152, .327

Impulsivity

.330

.113

.265*

2.927

.107, .553

Variable
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

R

AR2

.104

.104**

.179

.187

.075*

.007
.0 0 1

Numxlmpuls

-.020

.147

-.014

-.136

-.311,.271

IQxImpuls

.130

.142

.096

.920

-.150, .411

Note. Gender was coded 0 = male 1 = female, Numeracy = numeracy, IQ = total
estimated intelligence, Impulsivity = trait impulsivity, Numxlmpuls = interaction
between numeracy and impulsivity, IQxImpuls = interaction between total estimated
intelligence and impulsivity.
a Unstandardized regression w eight.b Standardized beta weight.
*p < .05. ** p < .01.
The results show that the control variables (age and gender) accounted for 10.4%
9

9

o f the variance in health domain risky decisions, R = . 104, R adj= -090, F( 2 ,1 2 6 ) =
7.309,/? = .001, as presented in Table 12. In the first step, both age

(P = -.22, p = .010)

and gender (P = -.20,/? = .021) had negative relationships with health domain risky
decisions. This indicates that males made more risky health related decisions than
females and that younger adults made more risky health-related decisions than older
adults. In the second step, cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated intelligence)

.
.
.
9
and trait impulsivity explained significant variance in health domain nsky decisions, AR
- .075,/? = .013, F( 5 ,1 2 3 ) = 5.377, p < .001. Trait impulsivity (P = .281,/? = .002) was
positively related to risky health decisions, such that as trait impulsivity increased,
participants made more risky health decisions. However, age (P —-.1 5 ,/? = .091), gender

(p = -.15,/? = .085), numeracy (P = .09,/? = .325), and total estimated intelligence (P =
.06,/? = .472) did not significantly account for variance in risky health decisions. In the

third step, the interactions between cognitive abilities (numeracy and total estimated
intelligence) and impulsivity did not add to the variance explained in health domain risky
'y

decisions, AR = .007, Fc/,a„ge( 2 , 121) = .541 , p = .584. Based on the preceding results,
males and younger adults made more risky health decisions than females and older
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adults. Additionally, participants with greater trait impulsivity made more risky health
decisions. Given that the moderator did not significantly account for variance in risky
health decisions, hypothesis 5b was not supported.
Posthoc Analyses
An independent samples /-test assessed whether the older and younger adults
differed on self-reported levels o f trait impulsivity. The groups significantly differed on
self-reported trait impulsivity, /(127) = 4.337, p < .001, r = .359, A/younger= 2.739; Moider
- 1.952, where the younger adults had higher levels o f trait impulsivity than older adults.
An independent samples /-test assessed whether males and females differed on selfreported levels o f trait impulsivity. The groups did not significantly differ in levels o f
self-reported trait impulsivity, /(126) = 1.414,/? = .160, r= .124, A^Maies= 2.716; Mpemales
= 2.498.
A one-way ANOVA tested whether older and younger adults significantly
differed on their risk perception, risk taking, and perceived expected benefits o f engaging
in risky behavior. Older and younger adults significantly differed on all aspects o f risk
tolerance as measured by the DOSPERT subscales. Homogeneity o f variance was not
assumed for hypothetical risk taking behavior, F (l, 127) = 10.986, p - .001. Thus, the
W elch’s F statistic was used to assess group differences. W elch’s F (l, 79.678) = 89.203,
p < .001, r =.475, A/oider= 26.42, Monger = 36.11, which indicates that the younger
adults were more likely to take hypothetical risks based on various risk taking scenarios
than older adults. Older adults perceived greater risk in various health and financialrelated risky scenarios than younger adults, F ( l, 127) = 19.578,/? < .001, r = .365, Moider
= 66.63, Myounger= 59.55. Similarly, younger adults perceived greater possible benefits o f
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engaging in risky decision-making than older adults, F (l, 127) = 20.364,/? < .001, r =
.371, A/oider= 5.061; Myounger= 5.671. A one-way ANOVA assessed whether males and
females significantly differed on risk perception, risk taking behavior, and expected
benefits o f engaging in risky behavior. Males and females also significantly differed on
all aspects o f risk tolerance as measured by the DOSPERT subscales. Males and females
significantly differed on hypothetical risk taking behavior, F(2 ,126) = 12.411,/? < .001, r
= .405, MMaies = 38.30, A/femaies = 31.85, showing that males had a greater likelihood o f
domain-specific risk taking behavior than females. The groups also significantly differed
on risk perception, F(2, 126) = 8.943,/? < .001, r = .352, A/Maies= 57.57, A/pemaies “ 62.88,
revealing that females perceived greater risk in each domain-specific risky scenario than
males. Finally, males perceived greater possible benefits from engaging in domainspecific risky behavior than females, F(2,126) = 4.482,/? = .013, r - .257, A/Maies =
5.761, A/females —5.433.
The Mann-Whitney test examined whether older and younger adults significantly
differed on numeracy and measures o f nonverbal intelligence. The reverse square root
numeracy and block score variables were used as data were significantly, negatively
skewed. Accordingly, results must be reverse interpreted such that lower scores indicate
greater numeric and nonverbal intelligence. Groups significantly differed on numeracy,
U= 808.0, z = -2.762, p = .006, r = -.243, where older adults (M = 46.17) scored
significantly higher on numeracy than younger adults ( M - 69.30). In contrast, the groups
did not differ in nonverbal intelligence, U = 1254.50, z = -.33, p = .973, r = -.029, M0/*r =
65.23 and M Younger = 64.95. A one-way ANOVA tested whether age groups differed on
measures o f verbal and overall intelligence. The groups did not differ in verbal
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intelligence, F( 1,127) - .984, p - .323, Moider ~ 10.365 and Myounger ~ 10.243, or in
overall intelligence, F ( l, 127) = .16b,p = .383, Moider= 10.404 and Myounger = 10.293.
The Mann-Whitney test assessed whether males and females significantly differed
on numeracy and measures o f nonverbal intelligence. The reverse square root numeracy
and block score variables were used as the data were significantly, negatively skewed.
Lower scores indicated greater performance on measures o f numeracy and nonverbal
intelligence than higher scores. Males (M = 52.79) scored higher than females (M =
72.01) on numeracy, U= 1364.50, z = -2.887,/? = .004, r = -.254. However, males and
females did not significantly differ in nonverbal intelligence, U= 1680.50, z = -1.318,/? =
.188, r = -.116. A one-way ANOVA tested whether males and females differed on
measures o f verbal and overall intelligence. They did not differ in verbal intelligence,
F ( 2 ,126) = 1.423,/? = .051 ,M Maies - 10.381 and MFemaies = 10.204, or in overall
intelligence, F(2,126) - 2.807,/? = .064, MMaies = 10.436 and M femaies = 10.24

CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
Overview of Results
The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating effects o f trait
impulsivity and risk tolerance (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits o f risky
behavior) on the relationship between cognitive abilities (intelligence and numeric
ability) and domain-specific risky decision-making (financial and health), after
controlling for age and gender. Additionally, this study sought to examine gender and age
related differences in domain specific risky decision-making. The participants o f this
study were 133 adults, split into two age groups: younger adults (N = 108; 81.2%) age 18
- 30 years, and older adults (N = 25; 18.8%) age 55 - 83 years.
Gender Differences in Risky Decision-Making
Hypothesis 1 stated that males and females would differ in the number o f domainspecific risky decisions they made. Males made more risky financial and health decisions
than females. These gender differences in risky decision-making are consistent with
published results in the risky decision-making literature (Byrnes et al., 2009; Chamess &
Gneezy, 2012). Specifically, males and females significantly differed on all aspects of
risk propensity on the DOSPERT subscales (risk taking, risk perception, and expected
benefits), where males endorsed more risk taking behavior and expected greater possible
benefits or enjoyment o f such risky behavior than females. Relative to men, however,
women perceived greater potential risk in various risky health and finance scenarios.
105
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Several investigators have examined further the consistent gender differences in
risk perception and have found that these judgments are based upon different factors for
males and females. When possible severe negative consequences are present in a risky
decision, males are more likely to engage in risk taking behavior than females. Closer
examination has revealed that for females, probability of incurring negative consequences
as well as perceived severity o f such consequences affects the risky decision-making
process. Moreover, probability o f incurring and estimated severity o f negative
consequences appear to be stable and significant deterrents o f risky decision-making for
females from childhood through at least early adulthood (Harris et al., 2006; Hillier &
Morrongiello, 1998). In the present study, probability of incurring negative consequences
and perceptions o f severity o f risky decisions were not measured.
Age Differences in Risky Decision-Making
Hypothesis 2 stated that older and younger adults would differ in the number o f
domain-specific risky decisions they made. Younger adults made more risky financial
and health decisions than older adults. Older and younger adults also differed on all
aspects o f risk propensity (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits o f risky
behavior). Specifically, younger adults had more risk taking behavior, expected more
possible benefits or enjoyment o f such behavior, and less perceived risk associated with
risk taking behavior compared to older adults. These findings are also consistent with the
literature on age differences in risky decision-making. For instance, Rolison, Hanoch,
Wood, and Liu (2013) found that relative to younger adults, older adults make fewer
risky health and financial decisions. Moreover, age-related changes in health risk taking
tend to decline smoothly over time, whereas financial risk taking seems to sharply decline
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with age. Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, and Hertwig (2011) argued that there are agerelated changes in motivations toward loss prevention, where older adults are more likely
to make choices that prevent loss than younger adults. It is also likely that there are
domain-specific differences in the impact that generational changes and lived historical
events, such as economic booms and busts, have on risk taking behavior (Rolison et al.,
2013).
Mata et al. (2011) argue that age-related differences in risky decision-making are
related to the type o f decisional task. When participants were provided with complete
descriptive information about probabilities and outcomes, younger adults made more
risky decisions than older adults, a finding replicated in this study. It is possible that
these findings highlight proposed differences in how older and younger adults process
risk communications when making risky decisions (Li et al., 2013).
Age Differences in Cognitive Abilities
In this sample, older adults significantly outperformed younger adults on
measures o f numeracy, but not on intelligence, despite the significant correlations among
intelligence and numeracy. In the present study, fluid or nonverbal intelligence was
measured using a block design task, which assessed the ability to manipulate and
transform information while utilizing visual-spatial and working memory abilities, all o f
which underlie solving mathematical problems (Shipley et al., 2009). Previous research
has indicated that crystalized or verbal intelligence tends to increase with age, while fluid
intelligence tends to decrease (Li et al., 2013). Given these reported age-related changes
in cognitive abilities, younger adults should have outperformed the older adults on
measures o f numeracy. There are several possible explanations for these findings. The
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most likely explanation is that the older adults in this study possess greater numeric
ability than their age-related peers who have been included in previous studies. Another
possibility is that the group level measure o f numeracy was biased, as females performed
more poorly than males on measures o f numeracy and females comprised 60% o f the
younger adult sample.
In the present study, numeric ability was not related to the overall number o f risky
health and financial decisions. Previous research has indicated that numeric ability affects
a decision-maker’s ability to comprehend information and make competent decisions
(Lipkus et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 1997). For instance, Schwartz et al. (1997) found
that numeric ability was related to the application o f risk information, where participants
with less numeric ability made less accurate decisions about relative risk. Further,
Lipkus et al. (2001) found that even well-educated adults experience difficulty
interpreting risk communication when mathematical information was part o f the risk
message. What is less clear however, is whether numeric ability leads one to make more
or less risky decisions, as researchers have primarily investigated the effects o f numeracy
on decision-making competence. One explanation for the current findings may be that
other factors, such as trait impulsivity, more significantly affected the participants’ risky
decision-making process and that numeric ability differentially led to some participants to
make more risky decisions, while others made fewer risky decisions.
Moderators of the Effect of Cognitive Abilities on Risky
Health and Financial Decision-Making
The present study adds to the domain-specific risky decision-making literature as
it is the only known study to this investigator to examine the moderating effects o f risk
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propensity (risk perception, risk taking, and expected benefits) and trait impulsivity on
the relationship between cognitive abilities (intelligence and numeric ability) and risky
financial and health decision-making. Previous research indicates that there is a
relationship between cognitive abilities, such as intelligence and numeracy, and decision
making (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Del Missier et al., 2012; Finucane et al., 2005; Li et
al., 2013). Some investigators argue that risk propensity may alter the relative salience o f
aspects o f risk communication, such as relative gains and losses, thus affecting the ways
in which risky decisions are processed (Sitkin & Weingat, 1995). Similarly, impulsivity
may affect the type o f decision-making strategy that is utilized, leading one to make
affectively driven decisions rather than deliberate analytical decisions (Penolazzi et al.,
2012). It was hypothesized that measures o f risk propensity (risk taking, risk perception,
and expected benefits) and trait impulsivity would moderate the relationship between
cognitive abilities and domain-specific risky decision-making (see hypotheses 3-5).
All moderation analyses in this study were non-significant; however, all
moderator variables (risk taking, risk perception, expected benefits, and impulsivity)
individually accounted for variance in domain-specific risky decisions. Specifically,
hypothesis 3 stated that attitudes toward risk, risk perception, and expected benefits o f
risky behavior would moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities and risky
financial decisions. The results o f this study did not support this hypothesis. One
possible explanation for this finding is that risky financial decision-making was measured
inadequately in this study as risky scenarios were created and yielded poor internal
consistency reliabilities. Thus, it is likely that the scenarios were measuring different
aspects o f risky financial decision-making, creating much variance in the data. Similar
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studies o f risky financial decision-making have typically utilized gambling paradigms
and had participants make one type o f risky financial decision. It is also possible that the
participants o f this study were equally exposed to some aspects o f younger adults in this
sample had little exposure to risky financial decision-making, thus creating more
variability in response due to inexperience or poor understanding o f the task.
Hypothesis 4 stated that attitudes toward risk, risk perception, and expected
benefits o f risky behavior would moderate the relationship between cognitive abilities
and risky health decisions. The results o f this study did not support this hypothesis. There
are several possible explanations for this finding. Again, risky health decision-making
was measured using risky scenarios that were created and yielded poor internal
consistency reliability. O f note, the scenarios used in this study were designed to measure
health and safety decisions, which may be too distinct to measure together. Additionally,
items were written to induce high issue involvement to elicit deliberative processing. It is
possible that these hypothetical scenarios did not elicit high issue involvement as
expected and led to affectively based decisions, thus increasing overall response
variability.
Hypothesis 5 stated that impulsivity would moderate the relationship between
cognitive abilities and risky health and financial decisions. The results o f this study did
not support this hypothesis. It is possible that trait impulsivity is not severe enough to
interrupt the decision-making process. Similarly, it is possible that the adults sampled in
this study are unrepresentative o f the larger older and younger adult populations, as these
participants consisted o f university students and community dwelling individuals, both o f
whom theoretically possess greater intellectual abilities than the public. Thus, it is
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possible that greater cognitive abilities buffer the impact o f trait impulsivity on decision
making processes.
Another likely explanation for these moderation findings is that incorrect
theoretical and statistical models were employed. Specifically, it is possible that a
curvilinear relationship exists between the proposed independent, dependent, and
moderating variables. For instance, it is possible that as measures o f intelligence and
numeracy increase, so does domain-specific risky decision-making up to a certain point,
at which time participants may become more risk averse. It is also possible that measures
o f risk propensity and impulsivity do not moderate the relationship between cognitive
abilities and risky decision-making. Some investigators have found that risk perception
and risk propensity mediate the relationship between risky decision outcome history,
problem framing, and risky decision-making behavior (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995).
Similarly, Harris et al. (2006) found that risk perception, risk taking, and expected
benefits o f risky behavior all significantly and partially mediated the relationship between
gender and risky health and gambling decisions. Thus, it is possible that trait impulsivity
and risk propensity (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits) mediate the
relationships between cognitive abilities and risky health and financial decisions.
Although the moderation analyses were not significant, each moderator variable
significantly accounted for some variance in domain-specific risky decision-making,
which is consistent with published findings (Byrnes et al., 1999; Crone et al., 2003;
Harris et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). When examining the overall amount o f risky
decisions made, males and younger adults made more risky decisions than females and
younger adults; however, for risky financial decisions, age and gender did not
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significantly account for variance in risky decision-making. This finding is inconsistent
with previous research that has found significant interactions between age and gender
when examining risky financial decisions, where younger and middle aged men
evidenced greater risk taking attitudes about financial risks than women. By older
adulthood, however, this gap had significantly reduced and men endorsed less financial
risk taking, bringing their risk taking attitudes more in line with those o f older adult
women (Rolison et al., 2013). One possible explanation for this finding is that financial
decision-making was measured more broadly in the current study than in previous
studies, which have primarily used gambling tasks to measure risky financial decision
making.
For health related risky decisions, age and gender accounted for variance in risky
health decisions. This finding is consistent with previous research that has found an age
by gender interaction in risky health decisions, where older adults make fewer risky
health decisions and the amount o f risky health decisions reduced more steeply for men
over time than for women (Rolison et al., 2013). Some investigators argue that women
are generally more cognizant o f health risks and engage in greater preventative behavior
than men (Rolison et al., 2013). Additionally, it is possible that there are generational
differences in risk taking, as things that are considered risky to a younger generation may
not be considered risky to older adults. Given the differences across decisional domains,
these findings also provide support for contemporary theories o f domain-specific risky
decisions-making (Blais & Weber, 2006; Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002).
Trait impulsivity accounted for a significant amount o f variance in risky health
decisions, where participants with greater trait impulsivity made more risky health
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decisions. The majority o f literature regarding the relationship between impulsivity and
risky decision-making has utilized gambling paradigms and has thus examined risky
financial decisions (Davis et al., 2007; Crone et al., 2003). Within these models, there
appears to be a trend where individuals that are more impulsive make more risky
decisions. Interestingly, trait impulsivity did not account for any o f the variance in risky
financial decisions in the present study. It is unclear as to why trait impulsivity only
significantly affected risky health decisions and not financial decisions. One significant
difference between this study design and those in the literature pertains to the way in
which participants made risky financial decisions. In the present study, a descriptive
forced choice risky scenarios paradigm was employed, while much o f the previous
research has used gambling tasks (Davis et al., 2007; Penolazzi et al., 2012). Thus, it is
possible that the way in which risky financial decision-making was measured led to these
inconsistent findings.
It is also possible that trait impulsivity as measured in this study was not severe
enough to disrupt the decision-making process across various decisional domains. While
some investigators (Penolazzi et al., 2012) have found that higher scores on measures o f
trait impulsivity such as the I 7 disrupt the risky decision-making process, participants o f
this study scored within the average range on the I7 as compared to the general population
across the adult lifespan (Eysenck et al., 1985). Moreover, 18% o f this sample reported
that they had previously been diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), which is consistent with national rates o f ADHD (Chamorro et al., 2012).
Although participants were not asked to report whether or not they currently take any
prescription medication to help manage symptoms o f ADHD, it is possible that

114

symptoms are well managed and groups means on measures o f trait impulsivity were
elevated due to well manage clinical impulsivity. Given the instability o f the effects o f
trait impulsivity on domain-specific risky decision-making, it is also possible that these
findings provide further support for the domain-specific risk taking theory.
Both risk taking and expected benefits had significant, positive relationships with
risky financial and health decisions, indicating that as attitudes toward risk (risk taking)
and expected benefits or enjoyment o f risky behavior increased, participants made more
risky health and financial decisions. Previous research has found that both o f these factors
impact risky decision-making, yet also note consistent gender differences where males
endorse more risk taking and expected benefits than females (Harris et al., 2006; Weber
et al., 2002). In this study, gender was a significant contributor to health but not financial
decisions. Similarly, risk perception and gender did not account for risky decisions in
financial domain, which is not consistent with previous literature that has cited strong
gender differences in risk perception (Harris et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). One
possible explanation for these findings is that participants did not understand the all o f the
risky financial decisions, thus leading to greater variability in response. It is also possible
that participants did not experience high issue involvement when making these decisions
and engaged in more affectively driven decision-making.
The lack o f consistency regarding the influence o f various personal factors across
decisional domains provides evidence in support o f the domain-specific risky decision
making theory; otherwise, we would expect to see findings that are more consistent
across decisional domains, gender, and age o f participants. Furthermore, these findings
suggest that various personal factors do affect the risky decision-making process. Two
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likely explanations for these inconsistent findings are that the model used to understand
these relationships was incorrect and that poor internal consistency reliability o f the
outcome measure led to significant variation in responses.
Practical and Clinical Implications
The findings o f this study yield both practical and clinical implications.
Practically speaking, understanding the ways in which various personal factors affect the
risky decision-making process will allow for more effective risk communication, leading
to greater comprehension and competent decision-making. For instance, much risk
communication is presented in the form o f percentages, probabilities, and proportions.
Research indicates that even well-educated people experience difficulty converting and
appropriately applying this type o f risk communication, thus reducing decision-making
competence. Moreover, there are age and gender differences in numeric and cognitive
abilities, which also affect one’s ability to make competent decisions (Finucane &
Gullion; Schwartz et al., 1997). These difficulties may be exacerbated when other
personal factors, such as impulsivity and risk propensity, influence the ways in which risk
communication is processed.
Given the current demographic trends, adults are living longer and are faced with
increasing numbers o f risky financial and health decisions than ever before. Some
investigators have found that older adults are more sensitive to the presentation of
information, which affects their decision-making competence (Finucane et al., 2002).
When decision-making competence is threatened, people are at risk o f making poor
decisions or deferring decisions to younger care providers, such as adult children.
Accordingly, understanding the ways in which older and younger adults are differentially

116

affected by risk propensity and impulsivity when making risky decisions can allow for
greater specificity o f risk communication. Tailored risk communication may provide
opportunities for older adults to remain competent in their decision-making as long as
possible, thus respecting individual autonomy. Tailored risk communication can also
reduce some o f the burden experienced by adult caregivers o f older parents.
Within applied health and mental health fields, better understanding o f risky
decision-making can allow providers greater opportunity to assess decision-making
competence, which may have direct effects on treatment. For instance, in the field o f
applied clinical or counseling psychology, therapists are required to explain the potential
risks and benefits o f treatment prior to obtaining consent to treatment. Theoretically
speaking, if clients cannot understand risk communication, then they cannot provide true
consent to treatment, thus violating ethical practice (American Psychological
Association, 2010). Again, understanding how to tailor risk communication can allow
for greater decision-making competence and respect for autonomy o f risky decision
making.
Limitations
There are a few important limitations o f this study that must be addressed. Although
the overall sample size ( N= 133) exceeded the suggested minimum sample based on
various power and design estimates ( N> 106), the vast majority o f the sample consisted
o f college students and thus may be unrepresentative o f the larger population.
Specifically, the final older adult sample consisted o f 26 (18.4%) adults between the ages
o f 55-89 years, which is approximately one-third o f the original target sample ( N= 75).

Consequently, this small sample size limits generalizability o f these results to adults over
the age o f 55 years.
The older adult sample consisted o f adults who were recruited from two separate
fitness programs, one in the southern United States and one in the Midwestern United
States. Although research indicates that older adults who engage in regular exercise may
be more similar than dissimilar (Boyette et al., 2002), it is possible that geographical
location may have an impact on factors that affect risky decision-making. Research also
indicates that older adults who engage in fitness programs differ significantly from those
adults who do not participate in such programs. For instance, Boyette et al. (2002) found
that older adults who participate in regular exercise are typically more highly educated, o f
higher socioeconomic status (SES), and are in better overall physical health than those
adults who do not. Moreover, some investigators suggest a link between exercise and
cognition: older adults who engage in regular exercise tend to outperform sedentary older
adults on components o f executive functioning, including reasoning, working memory,
reaction time (Clarkson-Smith & Hartley, 1989), multi-tasking, planning, and inhibition
(Hillman, Erickson, & Kramer, 2008; Voss, Nagamatsu, Liu-Ambrose, & Kramer, 2011).
Results o f neuroimaging studies also indicate that regular physical exercise may lead
to structural and functional changes in localized brain regions that are responsible for
executive functioning and overall cognitive abilities (Guiney & Machado, 2013). These
findings suggest that older adults who engage in physical exercise differ on a variety o f
demographic factors, such as SES, educational background and cognitive abilities from
those who do not exercise. It is likely that the older adults o f this study represent a subset
o f older adults that may be of greater physical and cognitive functioning than other
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samples, such as those who do not participate in regular physical exercise. Thus, the
results o f this study as they pertain to older adults should be generalized with caution, as
the sample size was small and not representative o f diversity o f older adults. Future
research should include a more heterogeneous sample o f older adults that are
representative o f the larger population.
Given that research has found links between physical exercise and cognitive abilities,
exercise habits o f all study participants should have been assessed; however, the exercise
habits o f the young adults were not. Research regarding the cognitive effects o f regular
exercise among young adults is less available and findings are mixed (Hillman et al.,
2008; Voss et al., 2011), with some studies supporting increases in working memory,
reaction time, selective attention, and inhibitory control (Guiney & Machado, 2013), all
o f which may significantly affect one’s decision-making abilities. Future research should
solicit information about exercise habits as well as assess how such habits may influence
the risky decision-making process.
Another limitation is that the younger adults were sampled from undergraduate
psychology classes at a southern American university. Grohol (2010) notes that this
longstanding tradition o f oversampling college youth within psychological research is
often done out o f convenience, cost restraints, tradition, and “good enough” data that can
be generalized to the larger population. Similarly, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan
(2010) argue that college students represent a "WEIRD; Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic" sample that is often vastly different from the larger
population o f less educated Americans. For instance, Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron,
D ’Onofrio, and Gottesman (2003) found that the influence o f environment and genetics
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on intelligence differ based on socioeconomic status, where for children raised in lowerSES areas, environment accounted for approximately 60% o f the variance in intelligence
and the genetic influence was almost zero. Opposing results were found among children
who were raised in high-SES environments. Given the financial and scholastic
requirements to get into college, it is likely that the majority o f this study sample is from
middle to upper-SES backgrounds and o f average to above average intelligence. Thus,
future research should include a more heterogeneous sample o f young adults.
Another limitation pertains to how risky health and financial decisions were
measured. Rather than having participants engage in real risky decision-making, such as a
gambling task, participants were required to make a dichotomous forced choice decision
based on hypothetical scenarios. Although scenarios were written to have high issue
involvement, it is likely that these scenarios elicited less involvement than a real risky
decision with consequences, such as winning or losing money in a gambling task.
Additionally, the health and financial outcome measures yielded very low scale
reliabilities, falling into a range that is considered unacceptable. Low scale reliabilities
indicate that individual items within a scale are measuring different constructs and thus
lack internal consistency. Given that the individual items on the health and financial risky
decision-making measures were written to tap various types o f risk, including disease
prevention, medical treatment, injury prevention, financial investment, saving and
spending, and gambling, it is not surprising that the scales yielded low reliabilities. Future
research should measure risky financial and health decision-making with real world risky
tasks or use measures with greater scale reliability. For instance, future investigation
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could require participants to make risky decisions regarding food choice after being
provided with information regarding the impact o f dietary choices on health.
Similarly, this study measured personal factors (intelligence, numeracy,
impulsiveness), risk tolerance (risk taking, risk perception, and expected benefits), and
risky decision-making via self-report measures. Although self-report measures are useful
ways o f tapping into a respondent’s inner psychological processes, they can also add to
measurement error and produce distorted results (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007;
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). For instance, research on affective
forecasting has shown that participants regularly make prediction errors about how they
will react and feel (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Similarly, research on judgment and
decision-making has found that when participants make risky gambling decisions in a
hypothetical scenario that they are much less risk averse than when they make similar
risky decisions with real currency (Holt & Laury, 2002). Finally, self-report measures
may be more vulnerable to processes such as socially desirable responding, item social
desirability, and item complexity and/or ambiguity, which may further distort results
(Podsakoff et al., 2003).
It is widely accepted among scholars that parametric statistics such as those used in
this study should adhere to parametric assumptions, as these assumptions allow for
generalizability o f results (Field, 2009; Osborne & Waters, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidel,
2013; Williams, Grajales, & Kurkiewicz, 2013). Although violations o f parametric
assumptions may not invalidate statistical findings, they may weaken results and thus
greatly reduce the generalizability o f findings beyond the original study sample
(Bohmstedt & Carter, 1971; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013). In this study, several o f the

121

parametric assumptions for multiple regression analysis were violated, thus limiting the
applicability o f these findings beyond the sample tested.
Implications for Future Research
Both the results and limitations o f this study provide useful insights for future
research into the risky decision-making process. First, future research should explore
domain-specific decision-making processes across the adult lifespan to better understand
the stability, or lack thereof, o f decision-making processes. To date, a few studies
including the present study, have examined age differences in risky decision-making via
cross-sectional designs; however, longitudinal data is lacking. Thus, future research
should examine domain-specific risky decision-making across the adult lifespan utilizing
within-subjects longitudinal designs. Moreover, heterogeneous samples o f adults should
be included in order to increase generalizability o f findings.
Some investigators have found consistent gender differences in the ways in which
males and females perceive and determine relative risk (Harris et al., 2006; Hillier &
Morrongiello; 1998). Determinants o f risk perception, such as the probability o f incurring
negative consequences and perceptions o f severity o f possible consequences have been
studied more thoroughly in children and young adults; however, little is known about the
stability o f these gender differences through middle and older age. Additionally, research
that has investigated risk perception in older age has used cross-sectional research
designs, which do not provide information about the stability o f such determinants. Thus,
future research should investigate determinants o f risk perception through the adult
lifespan using longitudinal designs to better understand how risk perception affects
domain-specific risky decision-making across the lifespan.
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It is also believed that emotions significantly affect the ways in which people
make risky decisions. Furthermore, some investigators argue that emotional processing
changes throughout the lifespan and may therefore differentially affect the decision
making process for older and younger adults (Rolison et al., 2013). Future research
should include measures o f emotional processing when examining domain-specific risky
decision-making processes in order to better understand how it affects different types o f
risky decisions.
Finally, future research should examine the effects o f personal factors, such as
risk propensity and impulsivity on domain-specific risky decision-making processes.
When possible, these studies should engage participants in making real world risky
decisions that yield actual relative consequences, such as gambling to win or lose money
because designs will mimic most closely actual risky decision-making.
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Please answer each o f the following questions. For multiple choice questions, select the
most appropriate response.
1- A g e:_______
2. Gender (please circle one):

Male

Female

Transgender

Other

3. If you chose “Other” above, please explain:

4. Ethnicity (please circle one): African American/Black
Hispanic

Native American

Asian

Caucasian/White

Other

5. If you chose “Other” above, please explain:

6

. Current marital status:

Single

Married

Divorced

Widowed

7. How many children do you have?________
8

. What is the highest level o f education that you have received (please circle one):

None Elementary High school or equivalent Some college/university
Associate’s degree Bachelor’s degree M aster’s degree Ph.D. degree
9. What is your current student classification (please circle one):
Freshman Junior Sophomore Senior
10. Are you currently employed? Yes No
11. What is your approximate annual household income (please circle one):
Less than $10,000 $10,001 - $19,999 $20, 000 - $35,000 $35,001 $41,999 $42,000-$51,999 $52,000 - $58,999 $59,000 - $73,999 $74,000
-$ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 $100,001 -$ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 More than $200,0
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12. Using the 5-point scale below, how financially-independent are you? That is, how
much do you pay for your own room and board, tuition, groceries, bills, etc.
without the assistance o f others (e.g. parents, spouse, family members, etc.)?

1

-

Extremely
Extremely
Financially
Financially
Dependent
Independent

- —

2

.—4------------

----------------------

Slightly

Neither Financially

Slightly

Financially

Dependent nor

Financially

Dependent

Independent

Independent

13. Using the 5-point scale below, where do you fall on the liberal-conservative
political continuum? 1 am
1-------Very
Liberal

-------------- 5
Somewhat
Liberal

Middle of
the Road

Somewhat
Conservative

Very
Conservative

14. Using the 5-point scale below, where do you fall on the continuum of
religiousness? I am
1--------------------------------- 2---------------------------- 3--------------------------- 4--------------------------- 5
Extremely
Unreligious

Slightly
Unreligious

Not religious
or unreligious

Slightly
Religious

Extremely
Religious

APPENDIX C
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Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the ‘YES’ or the
‘N O ’ following the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick
questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning o f the
question.
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION
1. Would you enjoy water skiing?
2. Usually do you prefer to stick to brands you know are reliable, to trying new ones
on the chance o f finding something better?
3. Would you feel sorry for a lonely stranger?
4. Do you quite enjoy taking risks?
5. Do you often get emotionally involved with your friends’ problems?
6 . Would you enjoy parachute jumping?
7. Do you often buy things on impulse?
8 . Do unhappy people who are sorry for themselves irritate you?
9. Do you generally do and say things without stopping to think?
10. Are you inclined to get nervous when others around you seem to be nervous?
11. Do you often get into a jam because you do things without thinking?
12. Do you think hitch-hiking is too dangerous a way to travel?
13. Do you find it silly for people to cry out o f happiness?
14. Do you like diving off the highboard?
15. Do people you are with have a strong influence on your moods?
16. Are you an impulsive person?
17. Do you welcome new and exciting experiences and sensations, even if they are a
little frightening and unconventional?
18. Does it affect you very much when one o f your friends seems upset?
19. Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?
20. Would you like to leam to fly an aeroplane?
21. Do you ever get deeply involved with the feelings o f a character in a film, play or
novel?
22. Do you often do things on the spur o f the moment?
23. Do you get very upset when you see someone cry?
24. Do you sometimes find someone else’s laughter catching?
25. Do you mostly speak without thinking things out?
26. Do you often get involved in things you later wish you could get out of?
27. Do you get so ‘carried away’ by new and exciting ideas that you never think o f
possible snags?
28. Do you find it hard to understand people who risk their necks climbing
mountains?
29. Can you make decisions without worrying about other people’s feelings?
30. Do you sometimes like doing things that are a bit frightening?
31. Do you need to use a lot o f self-control to keep out o f trouble?
32. Do you become more irritated than sympathetic when you see someone cry?
33. Would you agree that almost everything enjoyable is illegal or immoral?
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34. Generally do you prefer to enter cold sea water gradually, to diving or jumping
straight in?
35. Are you often surprised at people’s reactions to what you do or say?
36. Would you enjoy the sensation o f skiing very fast down a high mountain slope?
37. Do you like watching people open presents?
38. Do you think an evening out is more successful if it is unplanned or arranged at
the last moment?
39. Would you like to go scuba diving?
40. Would you find it very hard to break bad news to someone?
41. Would you enjoy fast driving?
42. Do you usually work quickly, without bothering to check?
43. Do you often change your interests?
44. Before making up your mind, do you consider all the advantages and
disadvantages?
45. Can you get very interested in your friends’ problems?
46. Would you like to go pot-holing?
47. Would you be put off a job involving quite a bit o f danger?
48. Do you prefer to ‘sleep on it’ before making decisions?
49. When people shout at you, do you shout back?
50. Do you feel sorry for very shy people?
51. Are you happy when you are with a cheerful group and sad when the others are
glum?
52. Do you usually make up your mind quickly?
53. Can you imagine what it must be like to be very lonely?
54. Does it worry you when others are worrying and panicky?

APPENDIX D
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC RISK TAKING SCALE (DOSPERT)
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Risk Taking Scale
For each o f the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would
engage in the described activity or behavior, if you were to find yourself in that situation.
For each o f the following statements, please indicate your likelihood o f engaging in each
activity or behavior. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:

j
Very
unlikely

2

3

Unlikely

Not sure

4

5

Likely

Very
likely

1. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F)__________________________________
2. Investing 10% o f your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F)

___

3. Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S)

_____

4. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (F)

_____

5. Investing 5% o f your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F)

_____

6. Betting a day’s income on the outcome o f a sporting event
(e.g., baseball, soccer, or football). (F)

_____

7. Investing 5% o f your annual income in a dependable and
conservative stock. (F)
8

_____

. Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S)

_____

9. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)

_____

10. Investing 10% o f your annual income in a new business venture. (F)

_____

11. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)_____________________________ _____
12. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. (F)_____________________________ _____
13. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)____________________________________ _____
14. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area o f town. (H/S)______________ _____
15. Eating high cholesterol foods.

(H/S)__________________________________ _____

16. Driving while taking medication that may make you drowsy.

Note. F = Financial and H/S = Health/Safety

(H/S)_____________
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Risk Perception Scale
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome
or consequences will be and for which there is the possibility o f negative consequences.
However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in your
gut level assessment o f how risky each situation or behavior is.

For each o f the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each
situation. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:

1

2

Not at all

3

4

Moderately

risky

5

Extremely risky

risky

Expected Benefits Scale
For each o f the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from
each situation. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:

1

No benefits
at all

2

3

Moderate
benefits

4

5

Great benefits

APPENDIX E
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General Numeracy Scale
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out o f 1,000 rolls, how many
times do you think the die would come up even ( 2 ,4 , or 6 ) ? __________
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances o f winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $ 1 0 . 0 0 prize if 1 , 0 0 0 people each
buy a single ticket to BIG BU CK S?__________
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance o f winning a car is 1 in
1,000. What percent o f tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?

Expanded Numeracy Scale
1. Which o f the following numbers represents the biggest risk o f getting a disease?
1 in 1 0 0 , ____ 1 in 1 0 0 0 , ___ 1 in 1 0
2. Which o f the following numbers represents the biggest risk o f getting a disease?
1% ,___10% ,____ 5%
3. If Person A ’s risk o f getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B ’s risk is double
that of A ’s, what is B’s risk ?__________
4. If Person A ’s chance o f getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B ’s risk is
double that o f A ’s, what is B ’s risk ?__________
5. If the chance o f getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get
the disease:
A: Out o f 100? _ _ _ _ _
B: Out o f 1000?___________
6

. If the chance o f getting a disease is 20 out o f 100, this would be the same as having a
% chance of getting the disease.

7. The chance o f getting a viral infection is .0005. Out o f 10,000 people, about how many
o f them are expected to get infected?

APPENDIX F
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Read each o f the following items and decide whether the statement is true or false as it
pertains to you personally and mark T or F beside the statement to indicate this.
1 . 1

sometimes feel resentful when 1 don’t get my way.

2. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too
little o f my abilities.
3. There have been times when I feel like rebelling against people in authority
even though I knew they were right.
4. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.
5 . 1 can remember “playing sick” to get out o f something.
6

. There have been occasions when I took advantage o f someone.

7. I ’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
8 . 1

sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.

9.1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
1 0 . 1

have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my

own.
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous o f the good fortunes o f others.
1 2 . 1

am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors o f me.

1 3 .1 have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
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Below are 20 hypothetical scenarios that ask you to make a decision based on the
information provided. Please read each hypothetical scenario carefully and select the
option that you favor for each scenario. There are no right or wrong answers, so please do
your best.
Financial Risky Decisions
Imagine that you have $6000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is
occurring. You have two investment strategies that have been recommended to you by
your trusted financial advisor to help preserve your investment.
Strategy A: If strategy A is followed, $2,000 o f you investment will be saved and
$4,000.00 will be lost.
Strategy B:

If strategy B is followed, there is 30% chance that the entire $6000 will be
saved, and a 70% chance that none o f your investment will be saved.

Which o f the two strategies (A or B) do you favor? _____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you won $1.1 million in the state lottery and have $50,000 in various debts
(e.g. student loans, car loan, mortgage, credit card, etc.). What would you do with the
money?
Option A:

Invest all of the money into long-term savings plan.

Option B:
Pay off all o f your current debts and then spend the rest o f the money
however you choose.
Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?______
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you won the Lottery for Life, which is a program that is designed to pay
winners up to $3 million. You have two choices o f how to receive the money.
Option A:
Take the $3 million lump sum up front and pay a hefty state tax on this
income.
Option B:
Take the payment plan option, where you will receive $25,000 per month
for the next ten years and pay state taxes on the annual earnings.
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Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

2

3

4

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

5

Imagine that you are looking to purchase a house and need to decide between two
attractive options.
Option A:

A well maintained house that is approximately 30 minutes away from
your place of work and $20,000 under your budget.

Option B:

A brand new house that is approximately 10 minutes away from your
place o f work and is $15,000 over your budget.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that your financial advisor informed you about a potentially lucrative investment
in an up-and-coming internet technology business. The advisor tells you that this
company’s stock has been steadily climbing and is projected to yield large gains on all
investments; however, the stock market is unpredictable and you are not guaranteed to
make a profit on your investment. The advisor asks if you would like to buy into the
stock. Assume that you make $50,000 per year at your job. You are presented with two
buy-in options.
Option A:

Invest 5% o f your annual income in this stock.

Option B:

Invest $1000 in this stock.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

__ _

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you are presented with an attractive all-inclusive 7-day trip to Fiji that costs
$1,800.00 per person. You really want to go, but cannot afford to pay for the trip out o f
pocket. You have two options that would make this trip feasible.
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Option A:

Book the trip and all related expenses (e.g. souvenirs, day trips,
transportation, etc.) on your credit card and pay off the trip and 20%
monthly interest over the course o f a year.

Option B:

Take out a small loan from your bank and pay off the trip, related
expenses, and 7% monthly interest over the course o f a year.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

4

Imagine that you are looking to purchase a new car and come across two attractive
options. Car A is a brand new top o f the line model, while car B is also top o f the line, but
two years old and was returned to the dealership after a lease expired. Assume that you
have budgeted a maximum o f S600 in transportation costs per month. Which car would
you purchase?
Car A:

Costs $600 per month after your down payment.

Car B:

Costs $450 per month after your down payment.

Which o f the two cars (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

1

Imagine that you received $900.00 from your annual tax return and currently hold a
balance o f $275.00 on your credit card. Aside from the money that you
owe on your credit card, you are debt-free. What would you do with the
money?
Option A:

Book a $1,200.00 trip to Europe for 10 days, which would require you to
spend an additional $300 plus all related expenses.

Option B:

Book a weekend getaway for $300.00, pay the $275.00 balance on your
credit card, and invest the remaining $325.00 in a savings account.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain
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Imagine that you were looking to invest $5,000.00 in a mutual fund. Ideally, you would
like to use the profit as part o f a down payment on a planned large purchase in the future
(i.e. a house, car, boat, etc.). Your financial advisor informs you that there are two
options.
Option A:

A slow growth mutual fund that is guaranteed to yield profit in the long
term (i.e. after one year).

Option B:

A fast growth mutual fund that may yield profit initially (i.e. after one
month) but is not guaranteed to yield long-term profit (i.e. after one year).

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you are at a casino and have already won $500.00. You’re playing a game
and are feeling lucky. What do you do on your next turn?
Option A:

Go all in on your next bet in hopes o f doubling your earnings.

Option B:

Walk away now and keep the $500.00 that you’ve already made

Which of the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

H ealth Risky Decisions
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak o f a lethal viral strain o f H IN I swine
flu, which is expected to kill 6 million people. In the Southern U.S., 250 cases have
already been identified. Two alternative preventative vaccinations have been proposed.
Vaccine A:

Vaccine B:

The current, standard vaccine yields a 60% chance that all people who
receive this vaccination will become immune to the H1N1 flu.
Comparatively, there is a 40% chance that all people who receive this
vaccination will not be immune and will still be susceptible to contracting
the H1N1 flu.
A new vaccine has an 80-85% effectiveness rate o f preventing the H1N1
in animals. It has not yet been tested on humans.

Which o f the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____
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Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

The National Cancer Institute has made two scientific breakthroughs that allow them to
reverse a substantial portion o f the cellular changes that lead to all types o f cancer. This
treatment has the potential to reduce the lethality o f all forms o f cancer; however, it
cannot be guaranteed that people who develop cancer and receive this treatment will not
die. The U.S. government is taking a nation-wide poll to determine which treatment the
public wants to become standard treatment.
Treatment A: This is a new vaccination that has been tested in animals and yields a 55%
effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth. This vaccination is
awaiting human testing.
Treatment B: This is a new vaccination that has been tested on animals and yields an
85% effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth; however, it
substantially increases the risk o f having a heart attack and has not yet
been tested on humans.
There are adequate resources to implement only one treatment program. Which o f the
two treatments (A or B) would you favor for national implementation? _____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you have contracted a rare and lethal disease and are asked to pick a course
o f treatment. Two treatment options are available.
Treatment A: The current medical treatment yields a 40% success rate.
Treatment B: A new treatment yields a 65% success rate, but has only been tested on a
small number (50) o f adults in Europe and appeared to lower the
participants’ immunity such that they were susceptible to other infections
and illnesses for one year following treatment.
Which o f the two treatments (A or B) do you favor?_____

Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that a major drug company will soon be releasing a new vaccine, which has been
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approved by the Food and Drug Administration, to reduce the chances o f contracting and
spreading Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs). This vaccine has been associated with
slight reductions in libido across all sexes.
Vaccine A:

Decline the vaccination, which may increase your chances o f contracting
an STI, but maintain your current libido.

Vaccine B:

Receive the vaccination, which will significantly decrease your chances of
contracting an STI, but may decrease your current libido.

Which o f the two vaccines (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Current research suggests that much o f the meat and animal byproducts that make up a
large proportion o f the American diet are genetically modified, consist o f antibiotics, and
that these animals are highly susceptible to lethal strains o f E-coli. Moreover, research
suggests that beef is the most susceptible o f all meats. Research has not yet determined
the long-term effects o f diets filled with meat and animal byproducts. There are two diet
programs from which to choose.
Program A:

A diet devoid o f all beef products and byproducts.

Program B:

Continue to consume meat and animal byproducts as a part o f your regular
diet.

Which o f the two programs (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

The federal government and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are taking swift
action to reduce the rates o f obesity and health-related concerns that arise from a diet that
is high in fats, cholesterol, salt, and sugar, which has been referred to as the “fast food
and pre-processed diet”. The government and FDA have developed two programmed
approaches to reduce the rates o f obesity and health-related concerns amongst Americans.
Program A:
Close all fast food chains across the country over the next 5 years and
require that all remaining restaurants follow strict food preparation
guidelines.
Program B:

Require that all fast food chains follow strict food preparation guidelines
and continue to allow Americans to choose their diet.
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Which o f the two programs (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you arrive at the beach on a hot, sunny summer day and realize that you
have forgotten your sunscreen at home, which is 15 minutes away. The weather network
advised all people to wear sunscreen if they planned on being in the sun for longer than
20 minutes. What do you do?
Option A:

Drive to the closest store, which is 10 minutes away and purchase some
sunscreen.

Option B:

Go to the beach without sunscreen.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you are out at a social gathering with your close friend. Both o f you have
had several alcoholic beverages and your friend insists on driving home, noting that they
are “Okay to drive”. What do you do?
Option A:

Refuse to take a ride home from your friend and call a taxi. The taxi will
charge you $25.00 to drive you home and you know thatyour friend does
not have money.

Option B:

Listen to your friend and accept the ride.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

Imagine that you need $20.00 in the morning and forgot to take it out at the bank while
you were running your errands during the day. You need to go to an ATM and take out
cash before you go to bed, but do not have a car and there is no public transportation
available. Your only option is to walk to the closest ATM. Which route do you take?
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Route A:

Consists o f 5 blocks and takes approximately 10 minutes to reach the
closest ATM, but goes through a bad part o f town that is not well lit at
night.

Route B:

Consists o f 10 blocks and takes approximately 20 minutes to reach the
same ATM, but goes through the center o f town, which is well lit and
monitored at night.

Which o f the two routes (A or B) do you favor?
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain

4

Imagine that you get into your car to drive to work in the morning and realize that your
seatbelt is broken. You try to fix it but are not successful. You cannot miss a day at work
without losing pay and need the money. What do you do?
Option A:

Call a friend to drive you to work, which would possibly make you late,
resulting in a minimal daily pay reduction.

Option B:

Drive your car to work without a seatbelt and arrive on time.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Not at all risky/
Not representative
o f risk domain

1

2

3

4

5

Highly risky/
Representative o f
risk domain
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Below are 11 hypothetical scenarios that ask you to make a decision based on the
information provided. Please read each hypothetical scenario carefully and select the
option that you favor for each scenario. There are no right or wrong answers, so please do
your best.
The National Cancer Institute has made two scientific breakthroughs that allow them to
reverse a substantial portion of the cellular changes that lead to all types o f cancer. This
treatment has the potential to reduce the lethality o f all forms o f cancer; however, it
cannot be guaranteed that people who develop cancer and receive this treatment will not
die. The U.S. government is taking a nation-wide poll to determine which treatment the
public wants to become standard treatment.
Treatment A: This is a new vaccination that has been tested in animals and yields a 55%
effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth. This vaccination is
awaiting human testing.
Treatment B: This is a new vaccination that has been tested on animals and yields an
85% effectiveness rate in treating cancerous cell growth; however, it
substantially increases the risk o f having a heart attack and has not yet
been tested on humans.
There are adequate resources to implement only one treatment program. Which o f the
two treatments (A or B) would you favor for national implementation? _____
Imagine that you have $6000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is
occurring. You have two investment strategies that have been recommended to you by
your trusted financial advisor to help preserve your investment.
Strategy A:

If strategy A is followed, $2,000 o f you investment will be saved and
$4,000.00 will be lost.

Strategy B:

If strategy B is followed, there is 30% chance that the entire $6000 will be
saved, and a 70% chance that none o f your investment will be saved.

Which o f the two strategies (A or B) do you favor? _____
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak o f a lethal viral strain o f H IN I swine
flu, which is expected to kill 6 million people. In the Southern U.S., 250 cases have
already been identified. Two alternative preventative vaccinations have been proposed.
Vaccine A:

The current, standard vaccine yields a 60% chance that all people who
receive this vaccination will become immune to the H1N1 flu.
Comparatively, there is a 40% chance that all people who receive this
vaccination will not be immune and will still be susceptible to contracting
the H1N1 flu.
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Vaccine B:

A new vaccine has an 80-85% effectiveness rate o f preventing the H1N1
in animals. It has not yet been tested on humans.

Which o f the two programs (A or B) do you favor? _____
Imagine that you won the Lottery for Life, which is a program that is designed to pay
winners up to $3 million. You have two choices o f how to receive the money.
Option A:

Take the $3 million lump sum up front and pay a hefty state tax on this
income.

Option B:

Take the payment plan option, where you will receive $25,000 per month
for the
next ten years and pay state taxes on the annual earnings.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you have contracted a rare and lethal disease and are asked to pick a course
o f treatment. Two treatment options are available.
Treatment A: The current medical treatment yields a 40% success rate.
Treatment B: A new treatment yields a 65% success rate, but has only been tested on a
small number (50) o f adults in Europe and appeared to lower the
participants’ immunity such that they were susceptible to other infections
and illnesses for one year following treatment.
Which o f the two treatments (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you are at a casino and have already won $500.00. You’re playing a game
and are feeling lucky. What do you do on your next turn?
Option A:

Go all in on your next bet in hopes o f doubling your earnings.

Option B:

Walk away now and keep the $500.00 that you’ve already made.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you arrive at the beach on a hot, sunny summer day and realize that you
have forgotten your sunscreen at home, which is 15 minutes away. The weather network
advised all people to wear sunscreen if they planned on being in the sun for longer than
20 minutes. What do you do?
Option A:

Drive to the closest store, which is 10 minutes away and purchase some
sunscreen.
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Option B:

Go to the beach without sunscreen.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you were looking to invest $5,000.00 in a mutual fund. Ideally, you would
like to use the profit as part o f a down payment on a planned large purchase in the future
(i.e. a house, car, boat, etc.). Your financial advisor informs you that there are two
options.
Option A:

A slow growth mutual fund that is guaranteed to yield profit in the long
term (i.e. after one year).

Option B:

A fast growth mutual fund that may yield profit initially (i.e. after one
month) but is not guaranteed to yield long-term profit (i.e. after one year).

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that you are out at a social gathering with your close friend. Both o f you have
had several alcoholic beverages and your friend insists on driving home, noting that
he/she are “Okay to drive”. What do you do?
Option A:

Refuse to take a ride home from your friend and call a taxi. The taxi will
charge you $25.00 to drive you home and you know that your friend does
not have money.

Option B:

Listen to your friend and accept the ride.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor?_____
Imagine that your financial advisor informed you about a potentially lucrative investment
in an up-and-coming internet technology business. The advisor tells you that this
company’s stock has been steadily climbing and is projected to yield large gains on all
investments; however, the stock market is unpredictable and you are not guaranteed to
make a profit on your investment. The advisor asks if you would like to buy into the
stock. Assume that you make $50,000 per year at your job. You are presented with two
buy-in options.
Option A:

Invest 5% o f your annual income in this stock.

Option B:

Invest $ 1000 in this stock.

Which o f the two options (A or B) do you favor? ___ _
Imagine that you need $20.00 in the morning and forgot to take it out at the bank while
you were running your errands during the day. You need to go to an ATM and take out
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cash before you go to bed, but do not have a car and there is no public transportation
available. Your only option is to walk to the closest ATM. Which route do you take?
Route A:

Consists of 5 blocks and takes approximately 10 minutes to reach the
closest ATM, but goes through a bad part o f town that is not well lit at
night.

Route B:

Consists o f 10 blocks and takes approximately 20 minutes to reach the
same ATM, but goes through the center o f town, which is well lit and
monitored at night.

Which o f the two routes (A or B) do you favor?
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“Welcome and thank you for participating in the study “Personal Factors,
Domain Specificity, and Risky Decision-Making”. My name is Rose Niles/ [say your
name] and I am a research assistant o f Rose Niles, the primary investigator o f this study.
In order to participate, you must be between the ages o f 18-89 years and you must
provide written informed consent. Please take a moment and read this consent form, as it
contains important information about this study”.
“You will notice that there are two identical consent forms in your survey packet,
one labeled Participant Copy and one labeled Investigator Copy. If you would like to
participate, please make an X in the box labeled Accept on both copies o f this consent
form. Please remove the Participant Copy and keep it with your personal records. If your
instructor is offering extra course credit, the Participant Copy o f the Informed Consent
form may be used as proof o f participation. If you do not wish to participate, please
return your survey packet to me and you can leave”.
“Today you will be completing a survey packet and asked to do a number o f
things. Please answer every test item honestly and to the best o f your ability. We will
begin with two timed tests and then you will be given unlimited time to finish the
remaining test items. Please take a moment to silence or turn off your cell phones before
we begin. Please do not use your cell phone or other electronic devices, including
calculators, to assist you on this test. Again, just do your best”.

APPENDIX J
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Per the test administration guidelines, all participants will be introduced to the
Shipley-2 via these instructions: “You will be taking two brief tests today. Please try as
hard as you can on each one and pay attention to when I tell you to begin and to stop.
Each of the tests has its own instructions. When I tell you to start, read the instructions
carefully and then start working on the test” (Shipley et al., 2009, p.6).
Introduction to Vocabulary Test on the Shipley-2
Per the test administration guidelines, all participants will be introduced to the
Vocabulary test o f the Shipley-2 via these instructions: “This task is about word
meanings. Ready? Read the instructions and begin” (Shipley et al., 2009, p. 6). After ten
minutes have elapsed, participants will be told to put their pencils down and stop
working.
Per the test administration guidelines, all participants will be introduced to the
Block Design test o f the Shipley-2 via these instructions: “The next task shows some
block patterns to figure out. It is on two pages that face each other. You can do both
pages without stopping. Open the form, read the instructions, and begin” (Shipley et al.,
2009, p.6). After ten minutes have elapsed, the participants will be instructed to put their
pencils down and stop working.
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